Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister
Creating sustainable communities

Home Office

Safer Places

The Planning System and Crime Prevention

ON HIS WAY HOME
IAN WASN'T BULLIED

EVERY DAY MR ALI
FOUND NO GRAFFITI
ON HIS SHOP FRONT

Safer Places

The Planning System and Crime Prevention

Contents

Safety and security are essential to successful, sustainable communities. Not only are such places well-designed, attractive environments to live and work in, but they are also places where freedom from crime, and from the fear of crime, improves the quality of life. Yet, for far too long, too little attention has been paid by planners and designers to crime issues. As a result, there are far too many examples of poor quality development that has resulted in a costly and long-lasting heritage of the wrong kind. By highlighting the need to consider crime prevention as part of the design process this guide aims to deliver safer places.

Planning Policy Statement 1 sets out how the planning system should play a key role in delivering sustainable communities. By drawing on some of the success stories to date, this guide acts as a prompt for all professionals to think about how the principles of crime prevention might apply in each and every village, town and city.

Underpinning this guide is the contribution which good quality design can make to creating places where people want to live, work, and enjoy themselves in the knowledge that they can do so safely. Whether through new development or the regeneration of an existing area, the thorough consideration of design principles can help improve an area's security — for both people and property — whilst also enhancing the quality of the local environment. It need not cost more either, and proper investment in the design of a development brings numerous social and economic benefits over its lifetime.

This guide challenges developers, designers and all those who influence the design and layout of developments, to think in a holistic manner about each development. A key principle is that there is no universal solution to every problem. Each location is unique, and so what works in one place may not work in another. It is therefore important that the many professional disciplines work closely together and, when they do, that they pay close attention to the principles and practical details in this guide and apply these carefully to meet the needs of the local area.

This guide is not a manual, nor is it intended to be a substitute for using experts on crime prevention, specialist urban designers and other skilled professionals. It is about encouraging greater attention to the principles of crime prevention and to the attributes of safer places. In this sense it is intended as a starting point — as best practice evolves, and local conditions change, planners will always need to build in new local solutions.

We intend that those who read this guide will be inspired to use its suggestions and help to deliver the high quality and safe development that we all wish to see and from which we can all benefit.

Keith Hill, Minister for Housing and Planning

Hazel Blears, Minister of State for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community Safety

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Sustainable communities

Sustainable communities are communities which succeed now, economically, socially and environmentally, and respect the needs of future generations. They are well-designed places where people feel safe and secure; where crime and disorder, or the fear of crime, doesn't undermine quality of life or community cohesion. This is why the new Planning Policy Statement 1, the overarching PPS setting out the Government's planning objectives, has at its heart the need to plan for safe and sustainable communities. This guide is intended as a companion to the policy in PPS1.

Designing out crime and designing in community safety should be central to the planning and delivery of new development. Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 requires all local authorities to exercise their functions with due regard to their likely effect on crime and disorder, and to do all they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder. The prevention of crime and the enhancement of community safety are matters that a local planning authority should consider when exercising its functions under the Town and Country Planning legislation.

Planning out crime also makes sense financially. Once a development has been completed the main opportunity to incorporate crime prevention measures will have been lost. The costs involved in correcting or managing badly-designed development are much greater than getting it right in the first place.

This doesn't mean that planning alone is expected to solve the problem of crime, or that crime prevention should be the sole concern of planning. Nor does it mean that planning can be expected to anticipate every eventuality. But informed, positive planning, particularly when co-ordinated with other measures, can make a significant contribution to tackling crime. The purpose of this guide is to help deliver that contribution. Its aim is well-designed, sustainable places that do not fail people and stand the test of time.

This guide is not solely about crime prevention. It is about making places that are safer, but also better in a number of other ways. This means it is concerned with the promotion of safe, sustainable and attractive environments that meet the full set of planning objectives. In short, it is about good planning in general, and its particular role in tackling crime and the fear of crime. The guide's aim is to show how good planning can contribute to crime prevention and the creation of safer places and hence to well-designed, sustainable communities. We need to create environments which people want to occupy and use, creating a strong and positive sense of communal identity.

■ **Newcastle Quayside demonstrates how design excellence and community safety go hand-in-hand.**

What makes a sustainable community?

The Sustainable Communities Plan connects with crime reduction and community safety and identifies some of the key requirements of sustainable communities as being:

- A flourishing local economy to provide jobs and wealth;

- Strong leadership to respond positively to change;

- Effective engagement and participation by local people, groups and businesses, especially in the planning, design and long-term stewardship of their community, and an active voluntary and community sector;

- A safe and healthy local environment with well-designed public and green space;

- Sufficient size, scale and density, and the right layout to support basic amenities in the neighbourhood and minimise use of resources (including land);

- Good public transport and other transport infrastructure both within the community and linking it to urban, rural and regional centres;

- Buildings — both individually and collectively — that can meet different needs over time, and that minimise the use of resources;

- A well-integrated mix of decent homes of different types and tenures to support a range of household sizes, ages and incomes;

- Good quality local public services, including education and training opportunities, health care and community facilities, especially for leisure;

- A diverse, vibrant and creative local culture, encouraging pride in the community and cohesion within it;

- A 'sense of place';

- The right links with the wider regional, national and international community.

■ **The Police are one of a range of players who have an important contribution to make in the production of successful places.**

What are crime reduction, crime prevention and community safety?

- **Crime reduction** is simply any action to reduce the frequency and seriousness of criminal events. Most crime reduction (and certainly that which acts through the planning process) is delivered through crime prevention.

- **Crime Prevention** in turn is intervention in the causes of criminal events, to reduce the risk of their occurrence and their potential seriousness.

- **Community safety** is an aspect of the quality of life, in which people, individually and collectively, are sufficiently free from or reassured about a range of real and perceived risks centering on crime and related misbehaviour; are able to cope with the consequences of those incidents that they experience; and if unable to cope alone, are helped to do so. All this establishes the conditions for them to pursue the necessities of their cultural, social and economic life.

A central aim of the guide is to show how planning has helped to deliver sustainable environments. The guide is about practical delivery, showing what has worked on the ground in a variety of contexts. It aspires to an evidence-based approach but the evidence, however, is not always clear-cut and there can also be tensions between what would be best for crime prevention and what would be best for other concerns of sustainable development. The guide, therefore, builds from an understanding of the principles of crime reduction and good design, and provides pointers to how these can be applied to suit different circumstances. The intention is to prompt innovative, flexible thinking and effective working between the developer, designers, police and local planning authority.

The principles need to be applied with careful thought. They are not templates and there are no universally applicable solutions. What works in one place may not work in another. Understanding the context and the unique nature of the locality are essential if planning is to be effective. Equally, good planning is about monitoring and refining, learning from mistakes as well as successes. Planning practice should evolve as the understanding to be gained from research develops.

The guide is primarily concerned with solutions open to influence through good planning and urban design. These concern the direct outcomes of planning control, principally the location and design of development. The guide also considers those occasions where planning is part of a wider approach, for example in the regeneration of run down areas, where planning plays its part alongside other measures such as management and law and order enforcement.

The planning system: both delivering and influencing crime prevention

Planning can contribute directly to crime prevention through the following tools:

- Development plan policies
- Supplementary planning guidance
- Pre-application discussions and negotiations
- Development control decision-making
- Planning conditions and planning obligations
- Planning can also influence crime prevention by working in partnership with the Police and agencies such as crime and disorder reduction partnerships.

Chapter 3 offers practical advice on how to use this toolkit effectively.

Who should read the guide

The guide will be of interest to anyone involved in the planning and design of new development. Its main audience is likely to be the officers and councillors in local authorities who guide and control development. But the guide will also be relevant to those who promote development and advise on it, including the Police.

It is hoped the guide will develop a better understanding between the many disciplines, which need to work together to produce sustainable communities. A mutual understanding, based on a common language, can help prompt the integration of interests that underpins successful projects and places. One of the central messages of this guide is that well-considered planning and collaboration between interested parties from the outset of a project can minimise conflict and reduce the need for compromise.

Readers of the guide are therefore encouraged to think in a holistic yet disciplined manner. The guide is not a manual to be applied by rote or a substitute for using skilled designers. Rather, the aim is to equip the reader with a better understanding of the links between crime and the built environment, so that problems can be tackled in an imaginative and considered way.

Preparing the guide

The guide is informed by detailed case studies of successful, safe places. All have lessons for the planning and design of new development. None of the places illustrated through the case studies are perfect in all aspects. They all have elements that work less well. These too, as much as what works well, are pointers to good practice.

The case studies illustrate seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention. These attributes were derived from a review of urban design and crime prevention good practice. They are set out and described in Chapter 2, with the aim of encouraging the design of environments that work well in the round. Chapter 3 explains the planning toolkit that is available, to local authorities in particular, to help achieve the places that are underpinned by the attributes.

The case study areas are introduced in more depth in Annex 1. This will allow those who want to follow up the case studies in detail to do so.

The crime theory and evidence base that underpins the guide is summarised in Annex 2, with key terms further explained in the glossary. Annex 2 also discusses some of the challenges in bringing together crime reduction and planning. It illustrates the relationship between design and crime is a complex one — for example, when trying to understand the impact of urban form on crime it is difficult to isolate the effects of urban design from those of social composition. Although, inevitably, the annex can provide no more than an overview, the reader should gain an understanding of the importance of measuring the interaction between the specific local factors. Practitioners interested in developing their understanding are signposted to relevant sources of material and expertise in Annex 3. For many, there can be no better place to start than their local police Architectural Liaison Officer or Crime Prevention Design Advisor. Practitioners could also usefully become involved with their local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership. Expertise is also available through local authority community safety staff or advisors such as NACRO or Crime Concern. Contact details are provided at Annex 3.

Principles of crime prevention

A simple appreciation of the major principles of crime prevention will help in considering the material presented in the rest of this guide. Further information is provided in Annex 2.

The causes of crime are many and complex. In brief, a criminal event happens when a predisposed, motivated and resourceful offender encounters, or engineers, a conducive crime situation. The situation in turn comprises a suitable target in a favourable environment, in the absence of people who might prevent the crime and the presence of those who might promote it. This has been called the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity[1]. Crime prevention intervenes to block, weaken or divert any one of these causes, as said, to reduce the risk of the event or its potential seriousness. The table below describes these causes and interventions in more detail.

With a few exceptions, planning can influence all of these causes and interventions in one way or another. As Annex 2 makes clear, the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity is not simply about independent sources of risk mechanically stacking up until crime is inevitable. Levels of crime and disorder are influenced by changing combinations of many local issues. Planners and their advisers in crime reduction, therefore, have to envisage such configurations.

The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity

Causes of crime	Interventions in causes
Short term influences on the readiness to offend due to current life circumstances (for example drug addiction, social exclusion, conflict, unemployment, poor housing and inadequate leisure facilities)	By changing these life circumstances to reduce immediate motivation for offending
Offenders' perspective of the crime opportunity — their perceptions of the effort, risks and rewards from offending in relation to the resources	By influencing offenders' immediate decision-making through deterrence and discouragement, including through conventional law enforcement and situational prevention
The offender's presence in the crime situation	By excluding or deflecting them from crime situations, whether keeping children from crowding sweetshops or attracting rowdy youths to clubs and shelters
The presence of targets (persons, property etc) that are vulnerable, attractive or provocative	By increasing the crime resistance of targets (e.g. through redesign of cars, mobile phones etc), lowering their value and removing them altogether
A target enclosure (such as buildings, cars or gated industrial estates) that contain valuable property or vulnerable people	By increasing the security of 'enclosures' (for example by design and construction of homes, vehicles, public areas)
A wider environment (such as town centres, housing estates, transport interchanges) that does not attract or generate offending and which favours offenders over preventers	By designing the wider environment through layout of housing estates, city centres and transport interchanges, to avoid concentration of attractive targets, to reduce conflicts; and to make surveillance and pursuit of offenders easier, and concealment and escape harder
The absence of crime preventers (residents, employees, passers-by, police or security guards who are ready, willing and capable of surveillance and intervention)	By alerting, motivating and empowering crime preventers (for example through defensible space designs which facilitate detection and challenge of intruders; and by fostering surveillance)
The presence of crime promoters (e.g. careless homeowners, deliberate 'fences' of stolen goods etc)	By discouraging, deterring and cracking down on promoters (e.g. converting careless homeowners and builders into crime preventers)
Offenders' criminality (i.e. their general disposition to offend and the influences that bring this about)	By reducing their criminal predisposition by early action on children's development at home and in school, perhaps targeted on well-known risk-factors
Offenders' lack of skills to avoid crime	By supplying resources to help them avoid crime (such as literacy or cognitive-behavioural programmes to reduce aggression)
Offenders' access to resources for committing crime ranging from weapons, to tools to know-how	By denying offenders resources for crime

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The attributes of safer places

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention form the focus of the guide. The attributes have emerged from in-depth research into crime prevention and urban design practice and theory.

This drawing together of disciplines is crucial, as the delivery of sustainable communities requires a sound appreciation of both crime prevention and urban design. It also requires planners, designers and crime prevention practitioners to work closely together on the ground.

The seven attributes, along with the rest of the guide, were developed and tested in conjunction with a Project Steering Group and a Sounding Board. Both draw from practitioners on the ground, including professionals working in law, the development industry and the Police. Organisations on the Steering Group and Sounding Board are listed in Annex 6.

Seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention are set out below.

- **Access and movement:** places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security
- **Structure:** places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict
- **Surveillance:** places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked
- **Ownership:** places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community
- **Physical protection:** places that include necessary, well-designed security features
- **Activity:** places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times
- **Management and maintenance:** places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future

The seven attributes in this guide are general and descriptive. They are not prescriptive. They are not a set of rules to be applied to all situations. Instead, they should be considered as prompts to thinking about crime prevention and promoting community safety through the planning system in the local context.

Key concerns are developed under each of the attributes. Some are closely related and are not unique to the attribute under which they appear. These concerns are followed by a list of pointers. The lists are not exhaustive: evolving practice and local conditions will always give rise to new ways of preventing crime and promoting community safety, whilst at the same time securing quality in the local environment.

Using the attributes

Planning's contribution to crime prevention must be based upon analysis of the local situation (carried out by someone equipped with the relevant interpretation skills). This means that similar problems will lead to different responses in different places. Thinking carefully about how each of the attributes relate to the specific local context will help to ensure that the response is appropriate.

Planning for safer places can present the need to deal with competing priorities. This will not always be the case but, for example, the attributes Access and Movement, Activity and Structure need careful consideration. Too easily, conflicts can arise between the desire, say, to create well-connected places and places where access is 'restricted' and 'ownership' increased. Occasionally this debate is articulated through inflammatory and exaggerated stereotypes. This is a mistake. The aim is to consider all priorities and decisions that produce the appropriate outcomes for the place concerned.

When faced with competing priorities, planning decisions must therefore be made in full consultation with all partners and be based on policies for planning and crime prevention which reflect the local situation and the views of those who will manage and live with the outcome of those decisions. The priorities are decided in a way uniquely suited to the specific circumstances on the ground. The case studies illustrated below show how planning decisions have been made in a range of local situations and in response to particular local needs. That these developments may have their

weaknesses as well as strengths does not detract from their intended role of stimulating thinking about better practice. One way of envisaging how the particular configurations of existing and planned features in a location might affect crime is to 'think criminal' – or, more formally, to think how criminals or disorderly people might react to, or exploit, the use, layout and development of land. How might the environment, and what it contains, affect the criminals' assessment of risk, effort and reward, and hence their decision to offend? How might it actually provoke them to offend? How might offenders' wider life circumstances (e.g. lack of leisure facilities) motivate them to offend?

Think criminal
Questions that planners can ask, or seek advice on:
■ Who is the local offender — given the features of the locality, what types of crime are most likely to be committed?
■ How much effort does it take the offender to commit the crime — and how can we use planning decisions and advice to increase the perceived effort and discourage the offender — e.g. making buildings physically more secure?
■ How much risk does the offender perceive when contemplating a particular crime — and how can we heighten that perceived risk and deter the offender — e.g. by increasing natural or other forms of surveillance, and empowering preventers to identify and challenge potential offenders?
■ How much reward does the offender anticipate — can we reduce this and discourage crime, e.g. removing graffiti quickly so the offender gets no kicks, or cut down on the value of materials such as piping stolen from buildings?
■ What resources does the offender have for committing crime (tools, weapons, modus operandi, time) — and how can we deny access or use of those resources (for example by restricting availability of tools, or designing security features to standards which anticipate their misuse)?

The seven attributes of safer places are explained below. They are illustrated by examples of their application in a range of contexts. Most of the illustrations are drawn from the case studies that are detailed in Annex 1. They are supported by other examples from around England.

The case studies are as follows:

Housing	Cromer Street, Camden Northview, Swanley Royds, Bradford The Orchard, Fairford and Allcourt, Lechlade Bishop's Mead, Chelmsford
Town centres	Newcastle-upon-Tyne Gravesend Stroud
Retail	The Bridges Centre, Sunderland
Leisure	@t-Bristol, Bristol
Commercial	Heywood Distribution Park, Greater Manchester
Health	West Road Health Centre, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Education	Parr's Wood Technology College, Greater Manchester
Park	Mowbray Park, Sunderland
Mixed-use development	Clarence Mews, Hackney
Car park	@t-Bristol, Bristol
Transport	Birkenhead bus station

Access and movement

Definition: Places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security

. . . .

Introduction: The success or failure of a place as part of a sustainable community is influenced by the nature and quality of its connections, particularly to local and wider services and amenities. Too few connections can undermine vitality, too many — and especially too many under-used or poorly thought out connections — can increase the opportunity to commit crime. The right level and type of access, resulting in places that are both well connected and secure, is achieved through careful and creative design based upon local assessment.

. . . .

Evidence from case studies: Incidents of all crime, including anti-social behaviour, in Mowbray Park, Sunderland, have fallen from 30-50 per month to an average of 10 per month, following the renovations that restricted access at night and encouraged users to stick to fewer, direct routes in the day.

Think criminal

Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- ◼ pedestrian routes are poorly lit, indirect and away from traffic;

- ◼ streets, footpaths and alleyways provide access to the rear of buildings;

- ◼ there are several ways into and out of an area — providing potential escape routes for criminal activity;

- ◼ it is easy for people to become lost or disorientated;

- ◼ streets and spaces are unwelcoming or underused by capable guardians.

◼ **The separation of traffic and pedestrians at different levels can lead to under-used, isolated and unsafe environments.**

Successful places have a well-defined movement framework

- A good movement framework has direct routes that lead to where people want to go by whatever means, including on foot, by cycle or public transport. This should cover the needs of all people, including the elderly and disabled.

- Routes for pedestrians, cyclists and vehicles should, in most cases, run alongside one another, and not be segregated. Movement frameworks based upon 'primary routes' and shared spaces, remove the need for under-used alleyways, short-cuts, footpaths and a large number of minor access points that can become vulnerable to or facilitate crime.

- Where footpaths are required, they should be as straight as possible and wide, avoiding potential hiding places. They should also be overlooked by surrounding buildings and activities.

- Good signage and points of interest, such as market stalls, places to sit or street art, encourage people to use identified routes and spaces.

- Keeping pedestrians and vehicles at the same level will avoid creating intimidating spaces such as subways, footbridges, underpasses and areas below viaducts.

- Where subways are unavoidable, they should be as wide and as short as possible with the exit visible from the entry, natural light introduced into the centre and high levels of artificial light. They might also incorporate measures to discourage vehicular use.

■ The success of new developments can depend on new connections being made. @t-Bristol, for example, benefits from a new footbridge linking the site to the train station and the rest of the city.

■ A clear, direct route from the station to the town centre means that pedestrians automatically choose to use the safest way. Basingstoke.

Path has led to dramatic rise in crime

■ Ill-thought out additions to the movement framework, such as this segregated cycle path through a Bradford housing area, can increase crime.

■ Clear but sensitive signage can help to create safe routes by directing users onto them. Stroud town centre.

■ Housing developments that are constructed along traditional grid layouts have no need for segregated footpaths between neighbourhoods — the streets themselves perform this role. Bishop's Mead, Chelmsford.

The appropriate movement framework for a place depends upon the local context

- Land-use is the biggest determinant of the type of movement structure required. Industrial areas, for example, need different kinds of connections from those in town centres, and can need fewer of them. The movement framework within a town centre should be more extensive than within a residential neighbourhood.

■ Alley-gating creates space that only residents can access. Middlesbrough.

The Countryside Rights of Way Act 2000 introduced powers to enable the closure of gulleys or alleyways in built up areas which are associated with crime and vandalism.

■ At Cromer Street, Camden, land between the blocks have been closed to public access, but the one main pedestrian route through the estate has been maintained during the daytime so as not to disrupt the existing movement framework.

- The quality and intensity of use of streets and footpaths can determine the number of people using them. The particular risk of crime and anti-social behaviour will also depend on the local context. For example, streets that are not well used may be more prone to burglary; moderately used streets may be more liable to mugging; and too crowded streets more prone to pick pocketing.

- Clear and direct routes should not undermine the defensible space of neighbourhoods.

The advantages for crime prevention of well-connected layouts include:

- Enabling more intrinsically secure building types (perimeter blocks, see 'Structure')

- Clear views and easy orientation

- More activity and so more potential for natural surveillance

The advantages for crime prevention of a layout with fewer connections include:

- Better opportunity to create 'defensible space'

- Easier for residents to monitor and exercise control over immediate area

- Fewer routes for criminals to escape along

- Fewer excuses for offenders to be in the area, or less likelihood that they will enter the area by chance

■ Allowing vehicles to enter pedestrianised streets outside shopping hours promotes activity at all times of the day. Gravesend town centre.

■ **An alternative to closing rear alleys is to open them up. Natural surveillance helps safety, but building security may be compromised and should be addressed by physical security. Halifax.**

- Removing vulnerable routes and spaces from existing developments can reduce the opportunity for crime.

- It is desirable to restrict public access to the rear of buildings. Secluded footpaths or alleyways, in particular, should not run along the rear of, and provide access to, buildings or gardens.

- Existing alleyways or other forms of access to the rears of properties can be fenced and gated — i.e. fitted with a self-closing and self-locking gate. However, where these form rights of way, appropriate authorisation is required. Alternatively, private gardens can be created from space to the rear of homes.

Checklist: Access and movement	
In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:	
1	Have the consequences of the number and nature of all connections been considered?
2	Do all routes lead to somewhere people want to go? Are all routes necessary?
3	Do routes provide potential offenders with ready and unnoticed access to potential targets?
4	Are routes for different users segregated when they could be integrated?
5	Will pedestrians, cyclists and drivers be able to understand which routes they should use?
6	Is it easy to understand how to travel through an area?

■ **Isolated routes such as this alleyway provide opportunities for access to the rear of buildings, and can become natural habitats for crime and anti-social behaviour.**

Definition: Places that are laid out so that crime is discouraged and different uses do not cause conflict

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Introduction: The layout and structure of a place — how the buildings, spaces, uses and activities relate to one another — affects its safety and sustainability. Some uses are incompatible with one another. Some dwelling or layout types are safer than others. Much depends on the local context.

Safe and sustainable places are also either robust enough to cope with changing requirements, or they are flexible enough to evolve. Crime prevention should be 'planned in' to developments from the outset. However, this may not always be possible and there is sometimes the need for a degree of post-completion adaptation in response to unforeseen situations or new opportunities. Careful planning will help keep this — and the consequent 'running-cost' solutions such as site management and maintenance — to a minimum.

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Evidence from case studies: The block-based structure of Bishop's Mead, Chelmsford experiences about half the crime of that part of the same housing development which has more cul-de-sacs, alleyways and footpaths.

Think criminal
Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:
■ buildings and private and communal spaces have a large number of sides exposed to the public realm;
■ the way that buildings, streets and spaces are laid out allow criminals to move around and operate undetected;
■ a place tends to bring together people who are likely to offend and suitable targets;
■ capable guardians are not present;
■ places become derelict or underused;
■ under- and unused buildings and spaces that have become vulnerable to crime are not remodelled or removed.

■ **A block structure allows for courtyard parking that is overlooked from all sides. Great Notley, Essex.**

The types of building and how they are laid out have major impacts on safety and sustainability

- A safe urban structure has few sides of the buildings exposed to the public realm, provides 'active frontages' of overlooked streets and creates a regular movement framework that focuses people and vehicles on to a small number of principal routes, rather than under-used and segregated streets and footpaths.

- Defensible space can be provided by private or communal gardens that can only be accessed from the surrounding buildings. Blocks surrounding such spaces also reduce the opportunities for graffiti on blank facades, such as gable ends.

- Homes in cul-de-sacs can be highly secure, but the cul-de-sac should be short and straight (to allow visibility from one end to the other) and should not be joined by networks of footpaths that are irregularly used but likely to foster criminal activity.

■ Private or communal defensible space provided within a block structure. Manchester, top, and Lewisham, bottom.

■ The flat is a typically secure dwelling type, with limited exposure to the public realm. St James Park, Surbiton.

■ The terrace is also typically secure, restricting opportunities for entries. The Orchard, Fairford.

■ Radburn layouts have become discredited due to the crime problems caused by the separation of vehicles and pedestrians.

■ **At Cromer Street, Camden, the spaces and undercrofts previously used for drug abuse and prostitution are now renovated, landscaped, gated and actively used by residents and community groups.**

Places should be structured to minimise opportunities for conflict, especially when designing for mixed use development

- The siting and design of potential 'honeypots' (places where people congregate and linger) and 'hotspots' (places where criminal and anti-social behaviour is concentrated) require particular attention so as not to bring crime to particular types of area. In certain circumstances it may be easier to manage a concentration of such places, so long as such concentration is not excessive.

- Out of scale facilities, such as supermarkets or leisure facilities that are intended for the wider, rather than local, community should be sited with care.

- Poorly sited street furniture (including street equipment owned by utility companies) can increase the opportunity of criminal and anti-social behaviour, such as vandalism, being a climbing aid or impeding vision.

Remodelling or removing vulnerable buildings and spaces makes places more liveable

- Buildings and public spaces that are under- or unused can become vulnerable to crime and anti-social behaviour. Where possible, local crime hotspots should be remodelled, removed or better managed.

- The removal of vulnerable public space from the public realm, where there is a surfeit of public space, can be particularly effective in areas of social housing. As an alternative, spaces or buildings can pass to private or communal ownership, such as gardens for the exclusive use of residents.

- In new developments, unnecessary and ambiguous space should not be provided. The aim is well-defined and purposeful open space. Quality can be more important than the quantity.

The restoration of historic elements of the built environment and run-down buildings can be an important element of crime prevention

- Buildings and spaces that are derelict, run-down or uncared-for convey the impression that crime and anti-social behaviour is tolerated, or more likely to go undetected, than in places that are well maintained. Dereliction can also provide opportunities for the shelter and concealment of illegal activities.

■ **At Northview, Swanley, the space between residential blocks that was vulnerable to crime and anti-social behaviour has been divided into functional areas with a variety of well-defined land uses, including parking, playgrounds, private gardens, quiet communal gardens and circulation space.**

■ The introduction of new commercial, cultural and residential uses has transformed this semi-derelict crime hotspot. Clarence Mews, Hackney.

■ The renovation for residential use of an adjacent disused warehouse has assisted the rehabilitation of Clarence Mews, Hackney.

■ The restoration of Newcastle's world-class Georgian streets has been a major contributor to the city's rejuvenation. The restoration has included stone cleaning, the reinstatement of windows and doors to their original form, the removal of unsightly shopfront advertising and the repair of buildings.

Checklist: Structure

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1	Have the types of building been selected and designed with security in mind?
2	Is the layout of the development appropriate for the identified crime risk, as well as to meet wider planning objectives?
3	Will all uses in an area be compatible and have potential conflicts been thoroughly thought through?
4	Does all public space serve a purpose and support an appropriate level of legitimate activity?
5	Has the remodelling, removal or re-use of buildings and spaces that are vulnerable to crime been considered?
6	Have the potential benefits for crime prevention of restoring historic environments been considered?

Surveillance

Definition: Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked

....

Introduction: Many of the other attributes — particularly access and movement, ownership and structure — are underpinned by the theory that places that are safer if they are overlooked. However, the notion of safety by surveillance is reliant on the assumption that, at all times, those who overlook will be a deterrent because they will act if they see a crime. Whether it is 'natural', organised or electronic, facilitating effective surveillance should be a core part of planning out crime. But it should not be relied upon as the sole strategy for tackling crime and disorder.

....

Evidence from case studies: There have been only two crimes in the @t-Bristol car park since 2000 — one case of criminal damage to the building and one theft from a motor vehicle.

Think criminal
Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:
■ criminals can operate, including travelling to and from the location, without fear of being seen;
■ criminals or their activities do not attract attention — or they are confident that no one will take any action;
■ all sides of buildings and all parts of spaces are not overlooked by surrounding users or passers-by;
■ buildings and spaces are not designed to allow surveillance 'outside' from 'inside' and vice versa.

■ **Traditional urban structures with 'active frontages' provide very high levels of natural surveillance. Stroud.**

Well-designed layouts of buildings and space create well-overlooked places.

- Places that could be vulnerable to crime should be overlooked by buildings or uses that are busy at all times.

- Windows and doors should face onto the street. 'Active frontages', rather than blank walls, should be encouraged. The more windows overlooking the street and other public spaces, the better.

- Open, bright spaces reduce the number of potential hiding places and allow people to be aware of what is happening around them.

- Criminals can attract notice if there are no good reasons for them to be there. Benches or low walls near cash-points, for example, provide places for potential robbers to loiter waiting for a suitable target.

■ **Corners offer an often unexploited opportunity for surveillance in several directions. The Point, Bristol demonstrates what is possible. These balconies offer 270-degree surveillance.**

■ The Bridges Centre, Sunderland, has been constructed along wide, straight uncluttered lines, much like Stroud's traditional High Street.

■ Many standard house designs do not include windows in the sides of end terraces, reducing surveillance and encouraging graffiti and nuisance. But this does not have to be the case. Both of the blocks in this example, Newhall, Harlow, incorporate generous windows into their ends.

■ Entrances to dwellings and other buildings should be directly from the street, plugging into the street network and providing active frontages. Bishop's Mead, Chelmsford.

■ The children's play area at Mowbray Park, Sunderland, has been sited at the edge of the park and close to the Park Ranger's office to increase surveillance. The ground level has also been raised for the same reason.

■ The diagram and photograph (top) show a traditional street with complete overlooking provided by bay windows. These enable visibility in three directions — forwards and to both sides — throughout the street. The redeveloped Clarence Mew, Hackney, has particularly large windows, resulting in a very active frontage and an excellent view of what is happening outside.

25

■ Cromer Street, Camden's park has been restored with improved visibility and surveillance, both within the park and from the surrounding buildings.

■ The arrangement of @t-Bristol's central court provides a very open space. Zooming in reveals how the same principles of open visibility are applied to the car park's pedestrian exits.

■ Birkenhead Bus Station creates cover and enclosure without losing visibility by extensive use of glass.

■ In the absence of active frontages, the only surveillance offered by this street is by users passing through it.

■ On street parking is overlooked, convenient and an efficient and flexible use of space. However, in-curtilage parking, especially behind gates or, better still, in garages would be more secure.

■ The redevelopment of Royds, Bradford sought to keep as much parking in-curtilage as possible.

Parked cars can be particularly vulnerable to crime and, unless they are in a private garage, must be overlooked.

- The most secure place to park a car is in a home's garage, usually followed by a driveway (preferably behind gates). However, this is not always possible, especially when seeking to design higher density residential or mixed use developments. Garages and driveways can also lead to 'inactive frontages'.

- If there is no in-curtilage parking, parking in residential development should be provided where cars can be seen. This could mean on-street parking, which benefits from overlooking but leaves cars more vulnerable to opportunistic crime and vandalism.

- A further alternative is parking courtyards, but courtyard parking that is not adequately overlooked by capable guardians should be avoided. Courtyard parking, as with all types of communal parking, should be small in size and close to the owners' homes. Notwithstanding the need for natural surveillance, a single, gated narrow entrance will make car crime more difficult.

- Larger, typically non-residential, car parks should comply with the specification set out in ACPO's Secured Car Parks Award Scheme. Details can be found at www.securedby design.com/developers/carparks.pdf

■ Parking courtyards are safer and more secure if they are overlooked. Allcourt, Lechdale.

■ The @t-Bristol car park demonstrates many of the characteristics of safe car parks, including: a high degree of surveillance and illumination; a minimum number of vehicular entry and exit points; on-going maintenance; and clear signage.

■ Garages can contribute to the creation of inactive frontages that offer no overlooking onto the street.

■ Imaginative lighting, including from the buildings themselves, can be critical ingredients of strategies to re-animate previously inhospitable areas. Waterloo, Lambeth.

Well-designed public lighting increases the opportunity for surveillance at night and sends out positive messages about the management of an area.

- Well-lit spaces are crucial in reducing the fear of crime, making places more 'liveable' and, in most cases, increasing legitimate activity after dark. However, lighting can also sometimes aid those committing offences.

- The entire site should have adequate lighting, although higher lighting levels may be appropriate for vulnerable areas.

- Lighting should be sensitive to the needs of residents and users. It should provide security without resulting in glare and compromising privacy.

- Lighting in places that are vulnerable to crime can also be vulnerable to vandalism. In such situations, the design of lighting and the placement of lighting fixtures and columns should be robust and secure.

■ The positive effect that lighting can have on the quality of the public realm makes places more attractive as well as safer. Newcastle.

■ Like wall-mounted lighting, upward-facing reflective lighting can be both attractive and difficult to vandalise. @t-Bristol.

■ Lighting that is bright, secure and difficult to vandalise is of utmost importance in indoor car parks. @t-Bristol.

■ Under-lit spaces, even in the daytime, can leave users vulnerable.

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CCTV has proved particularly useful in reducing car crime. @t–Bristol.

To make CCTV effective in areas that are unlit, infra-red cameras can be fitted with sensors that detect activity at night, activating the cameras. Mowbray Park, Sunderland.

Signs must be erected to let people know that they are being watched.

Further advice on CCTV can be found in National evaluation of CCTV: early findings on scheme implementation — effective practice guide at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/dpr7.pdf

Places to which there is no legitimate access after dark could be unlit. This would discourage the presence of potential victims of crime, as well as potential offenders. If necessary, security lighting could be used to alert others of unauthorised access.

Closed circuit television (CCTV) can have a positive impact on crime, especially when implemented as part of a wider package

- CCTV is most effective when combined with good lighting and designed to counter a set of offences, and supported by management, continuous monitoring and adequate response.

- CCTV should not be considered as an alternative to getting the design right in the first place but retrospectively can be used to compensate for poor design.

- The way CCTV systems are designed and used should be influenced by their intended purpose. For example, will it be monitored and used to direct police or other security personnel in the case of an incident, or will it be recorded in the hope that the pictures will help to identify and prosecute offenders?

- Using signs to publicise that CCTV is in operation can increase its impact and is necessary to comply with Data Protection Act Codes of Practice.

Checklist: Surveillance

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1	Are opportunities for surveillance from the subject and adjacent buildings maximised?
2	Will those most likely to observe any criminal or anti-social behaviour respond appropriately?
3	Are both of the above true at all times of the day, week and year?
4	Have efforts been made to eliminate 'inactive' frontages and corners?
5	Where appropriate, such as in public buildings, does the design allow for high visibility into the building or site?
6	Are parked cars highly visible but secure?
7	Has lighting been a primary consideration in planning out crime?
8	Is the standard of lighting and its maintenance regime adequate and is it resistant to vandalism and damage? Is it well-designed and well-sited?
9	Is CCTV the best way to solve the particular problem and is it the most effective use of resources?
10	Is the CCTV part of a wider package of crime prevention measures?
11	Will the resources be in place to maintain the CCTV system, including staff to monitor and respond to the pictures, in future years?

Ownership

Definition: Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community

....

Introduction: Encouraging residents and users of places to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for their surroundings can make an important contribution to crime prevention. This can be facilitated by clarity in where public space ends and where communal, semi-private or private space begins. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged.

Evidence from case studies:

Crime figures before and after the refurbishment of Northview, Swanley, show extraordinary success:

	33 months prior to refurbishment	48 months after refurbishment
Dwelling burglaries	45	12
Other burglaries	50	4
Criminal damage	153	22
Violent crime	37	13

Think criminal

Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

- ▪ it is unclear whether space is public or private, and what behaviour is expected in each;

- ▪ private space is easily accessible to people who have no right to be there;

- ▪ an offender's presence in the area does not attract attention;

- ▪ a place feels like it is not under the supervision of local residents, businesses, organisations or other users.

▪ **Low fences in front of houses creating a safe and attractive environment. Bishop's Mead, Chelmsford.**

Places should have clear distinction between public, semi-private/communal and private space

- Sensitive placement and appropriate selection of physical barriers — gates, fences, walls and hedges — create safe places that are also attractive.

- High fences and landscape that actively impede access are most appropriate in places that are vulnerable to crime, such as the back of dwellings.

- Such barriers must be visually permeable so as not to hinder natural or other forms of surveillance or provide places for offenders to hide.

- Lower barriers, hedges and bushes are also highly useful to signify the public/private divide.

- Gated communities may increase the sustainability and social mix of an area by making housing more attractive where problems of crime and image could otherwise lead to the development's failure. The Government believes, however, that it is normally preferable for new development to be integrated into the wider community and that the gating of developments should only be considered as a last resort (see the Cromer Street, Camden case study).

■ An attractive gated entrance to Mowbray Park, Sunderland, which is closed after dark.

■ The fence around the curtilage of the West Road Health Centre, Newcastle, creates an effective barrier.

■ A fence that can be seen through, defining and restricting access to a newly-created communal space without providing opportunities for concealment. Crossley Stansfield, Halifax.

■ Hedges in front of houses create an effective barrier as well as an attractive environment, although they do provide opportunities for concealment. Ebor Gardens, Leeds.

■ A newly-created gated community in a wider area of social housing as a response to very high crime levels. Cromer Street, Camden.

■ As nobody has asserted their ownership over this space, accepted behavioural norms do not apply, leading to a higher risk of crime and anti-social behaviour.

Where the use of barriers is inappropriate, creative approaches to defining the boundaries between public, communal and private space may contribute to crime prevention

- Demarcation of territory without physical barriers may be appropriate to some settings, provided that the intention is not to impede access physically.

- Design techniques that most people respond to include changes in paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping, planting and signage.

- Landscaping can be used to make places safer as well as more attractive, provided it does not restrict natural surveillance. Thorny or prickly plants can help to protect property.

Allowing neighbourhoods to express their identity can generate feelings of ownership and reduce crime

- Involving residents and users – including young people – in the management and design of their area provides a real sense of ownership. This can be achieved in a number of ways, such as town centre management partnerships, tenant management organisations, community development trusts, regeneration programmes and management trusts.

- Effective management organisations should: have a defined purpose and the power to make a difference; be inclusive and representative of all categories of stakeholders and as many individual stakeholders as possible; be adequately resourced; and be in place at the earliest opportunity.

■ The overlooked parking court at Bishop's Mead, Chelmsford, is recognisably not part of the public realm.

■ A buffer zone between the street and the house can also be created by planting and paving. Bishop's Mead, Chelmsford.

■ Buffer zones-an area of defensible space between house frontages and the street-separate the public and the private. Green Dragon House, Camden.

■ Planting around a children's play area impedes access, defines the boundary and makes for a pleasing environment without obscuring visibility. Northview, Swanley.

■ The low fence, coloured surface and sign leave little doubt about who is welcome into the playground at Mowbray Park, Sunderland.

The built environment can generate feelings of ownership by:

■ The colour-coding of different residential neighbourhoods. Northview, Swanley, and Crossley Stansfield, Halifax.

■ Making a feature of the approach to a neighbourhood. Royds, Bradford.

■ Creating civic pride. The Winter Gardens, Mowbray Park, Sunderland.

■ Involving the community in the design of communal spaces. Royal Free Square, Islington.

■ The use of a common, distinctive design throughout a development. Parrs Wood Technology College, Greater Manchester, and Clarence Mews, Hackney.

■ Providing public art and communal facilities. St James Park, Surbiton.

Checklist: Ownership

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1	Will it be clear to users — including potential offenders and capable guardians — which space is public, communal, semi-private and private?
2	Are the boundaries between public, communal and private space signified in the most appropriate manner, be it a physical barrier or a psychological barrier such as changes in paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping and signage?
3	Will the place have an identity of its own?
4	Are all those who should feel ownership involved in defining the place's identity?
5	Are barriers of a high quality of design in their detailing and appropriate to their local context?

Physical protection

Definition: Places that include necessary, well-designed security features

Introduction: This attribute concerns 'target hardening' and other measures that make it more difficult to commit offences and instil a feeling of safety in users. Some measures are directly deliverable through the planning process. Others complement what can be achieved by good planning.

The Secured by Design initiative offers in-depth advice on physical protection as part of a broad approach to designing out crime. It also sets out technical standards for building security. In the interest of brevity, that useful advice is not repeated here, but it forms an essential part of the crime prevention toolkit.

Evidence from case studies: Dwelling burglary in Royds, Bradford, has decreased by 69% in the last 5 years.

The Loss Prevention Council's List of Approved Fire and Security Products and Services: a Specifiers' Guide includes security ratings for many crime prevention products.

Think criminal
Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:
■ the target hardening measures, for example for doors, windows and gates, set out by Secured by Design are not selected to be appropriate to the building and to the crime risk faced: not integrated; not properly installed; and not properly used;
■ it is easy to enter and exit properties illegitimately;
■ it is easy to remove property.

One of the most effective ways to prevent property crime is to make the property itself as secure as possible.

- Comprehensive advice on the target hardening of homes, commercial development and special sites can be found at www.securedbydesign.com/developers.

- Planning in quality physical security from the outset is usually much cheaper and easier than retro-fitting it later.

Many security measures may be installed without compromising the quality of the local environment.

- Crime prevention measures that adversely affect the way a place looks and feels can undermine the aim of safe and sustainable communities. Some measures, such as grilles and barbed wire, are often unattractive and increase the fear of crime by suggesting that an area is unsafe.

■ Secure doors and entryphone systems protect multiple occupants. Cromer Street, Camden.

■ Whilst no substitute, CCTV can supplement 'harder' forms of security. In Stroud town centre the visual impact of CCTV has been ameliorated by disguising cameras as vintage street lights. However, CCTV can be more effective as a deterrent if it is highly visible (see Surveillance).

| Checklist: Physical protection |
| --- |
| In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind: |
| **1** Have the 'target hardening' principles of Secured by Design been addressed? |
| **2** Has the potentially negative visual impact of crime prevention measures been addressed and, where these cannot be ameliorated by good design, have the advantages been weighed against their adverse impacts? |

■ Doors and windows should be specified to recognised security standards that make unlawful entry significantly more difficult. Clarence Mews, Hackney.

■ West Road Health Centre, Newcastle's gate and double doors form three barriers to intruders.

■ Gravel paths allow those approaching houses to be heard. Allcourt, Lechlade.

■ Perimeter fences can be made to look attractive by, for example, combining them with a hedge, allowing visibility through or including simple design motifs. Heywood Distribution Park, Greater Manchester, and St James Park, Surbiton.

■ Treating gates and grilles as public art minimises the negative visual impact and accentuates the positive. Mowbray Park, Sunderland, and Poole's Wharf, Bristol.

■ An example of security having a negative impact on a facility — an unwelcoming station entrance.

■ Roller-shutter blinds provide a high level of security, but can have a negative effect on the street scene, are susceptible to graffiti and do not reflect light in the way that windows do. Alternatives such as open grilled designs or internal shutters should be considered. Where external roller shutters are necessary, they can have translucent panels or be coloured to make a positive contribution to the street scene. Halifax.

■ Although the doors and windows on this development are of an appropriate standard, security is compromised by design features that make access to upper levels easier.

■ Insufficient security has led this householder to take the protection of their home into their own hands in an irresponsible manner.

Definition: Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times

....

Introduction: Crime can be deterred through the 'eyes on the street' of people going about their everyday business. However, too much activity risks anonymity and can also lead to increases in the opportunity to commit particular types of crime, such as pick-pocketing, and anti-social behaviour. Decisions about which levels and types of activity are appropriate need to be made for the local context.

....

Evidence from case studies: Newcastle city centre has seen booming visitor numbers, hence activity, in recent years. Overall crime fell by 26% between 1999/00 and 2001/02.

The ODPM's Mixed Use Development: Practice and Potential includes practical advice on planning for mixed use development.

Think criminal

Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

■ an area is either very quiet or very busy, depending on the local context and the type of crime;

■ sifferent groups of people feel that there is nothing to do;

■ criminals can go about their business unnoticed;

■ places become devoid of activity at certain times of the day or night, whilst remaining accessible to offenders;

■ potential offenders and/or victims are concentrated in the same place at the same time, such as bus stops, taxi ranks or fast food outlets after pubs close, or areas of the town centre throughout the evening.

■ **Successful streets and spaces are popular and safe for a wide range of self-policing users. Newcastle Quayside.**

Attracting a large number of law abiding users is a character of good places. They are also safer.

● Certain types of place, such as public squares and town centres, thrive on attracting a large number of people. The key is to create a high quality environment and alternative opportunities and activities for those who might otherwise become involved in crime or disorder.

● Different people use the same spaces in different ways and at different times. Rather than encouraging segregation or 'monocultures' where one group dominates, the public realm should be designed to be enjoyed by different cultural or age groups at the same time. This can be done by providing a range of complementary activities and designing the environment to minimise conflict.

Attracting the right mix of uses can generate greater activity and surveillance

● The right mix of uses in an area almost always leads to more surveillance, more of the time.

● Care should be taken to ensure that the mixed uses in a locality are compatible. For example, concentrations of bars and clubs are usually best sited away from residential areas.

● A town centre residential population brings activity, surveillance and ownership, and should be encouraged.

■ The imaginative use of public art in the Ropewalk, Bridgewater has successfully encouraged activity on a previously under-used, and so vulnerable to crime, riverside walk. Public art makes places interesting and attractive to a wide range of visitors.

■ Water features are particularly popular, although require a high level of maintenance. @t-Bristol.

■ Activity on the street adds character and provides natural surveillance. Stroud town centre.

■ The Castle Street Car Park, Canterbury is wrapped in housing, introducing a town centre population as well as hiding a visually unattractive feature.

■ There are creative examples of unexpected uses being successfully mixed with positive effects on crime patterns. Parrs Wood Technology College, Greater Manchester, has been redeveloped with a leisure centre and a hotel on the same site. Security for the three facilities is strategically co-ordinated.

■ Whilst they can be a nuisance in residential areas, ball games should only be discouraged if there are alternative locations or activities for young people.

■ Spaces like this one, which can be perceived as being unwelcoming and unattractive, run the risk of becoming hotspots for crime and anti-social behaviour.

- Within residential areas, there can be advantages for crime prevention to attracting a mix of people of different ages, lifestyles and economic status. This avoids concentrations of groups such as young people that may be more likely to offend, or be targeted as victims, or create areas devoid of occupation, activity and surveillance at particular times. Providing a range of housing types in terms of dwelling size, type, tenure and affordability can enable this.

- Providing activities for young people, such as 'hang outs'/youth shelters, youth centres, sports pitches, helps to provide a focus for and can prevent criminal behaviour. Care should be taken not to attract excessive numbers to any one location.

The development of an evening economy is a good way of diversifying uses and extending activity throughout the day and night. However, careful thought must be given to the other attributes to minimise the resultant crime risk

- An evening economy that works well in both economic and safety terms includes a range of uses, not just pubs and bars. Theatres, cinemas, restaurants, galleries and shops can all contribute to ensuring that a potentially violent drinking culture does not make town centres unsafe places to be in the evening.

- Land use control is part of a package of measures to draw advantages from the evening economy and avoid the opportunities for criminal activity that can be associated with it. For example, the provision of secure car parking, public transport facilities and lighting can be encouraged as part of a clear strategy.

PPG6 offers further guidance of the role of the planning system in relation to the evening economy.

Home Office *Crime Reduction Toolkit: Alcohol Related Crime* also provides advice.

■ The crime and anti-social behaviour caused by young people can be minimised by providing activities and spaces that stimulate their interest and they can call their own. Millbank estate, Westminster.

■ Three types of town centre housing that introduce life to areas that might otherwise be dangerously deserted after dark: living over the shop in Stroud and new build in Newcastle.

■ Outdoor restaurant tables can animate the street scene introduce 'eyes on the street' and lessen the dominance of drinking on the evening economy. Lambeth.

Strategies to get the most from the evening economy:

- Spreading or concentrating the evening economy throughout a town or district to suit the local context. Spreading avoids creating a 'critical mass' of potential offenders and spreading the economic benefits, whereas concentration of activities ensures that the evening economy is located so as to avoid conflicting uses, such as with residential areas and may also be easier to police. Particular consideration should be given to the number of licensed bars relative to the layout of the area.

- Diversifying the evening economy: encouraging restaurants, shops, cafes, galleries, libraries, museums and other cultural venues to set up and to stay open later.

- Getting the transport links right: co-ordinating public transport, taxi ranks and car parks and frequent late night public transport, to enable users to leave for home as soon as they are ready.

- Co-ordinating planning and management: promoting an 'area management approach', which could include lighting and CCTV and the co-ordination of planning and licensing functions.

Checklist: Activity

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1	Will as many law abiding people as possible be attracted to use the public realm?
2	Is there a strategy for encouraging residential population in town centres?
3	Should the evening economy be nurtured, and, if so, is it diverse and inclusive?
4	Are mixed uses successfully integrated with one another?
5	Are all uses in an area compatible and have potential conflicts been thoroughly addressed?
6	Will what attracts people to the public realm uphold its attractiveness?

Management and maintenance

Definition: Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future

....

Introduction: Management and maintenance embrace both how a place looks and how it functions over time. Whilst getting the physical design and build of areas right is paramount, management and maintenance will remain

important factors in the creation of safer places. It is crucial to address these concerns at the out set of a development proposal so as to minimise running costs and the requirement for maintenance effort (which may not always be available).

....

Evidence from case studies: Shop theft in Gravesend town centre declined by 19% between 1999/00 and 2001/02. In the same period, shop theft in Stroud town centre has fallen by a quarter and burglary has halved.

Think criminal

Crime and anti-social behaviour are more likely to occur if:

■ places are untidy or unattractive, giving the impression of not being cared for or that crime and disorder is tolerated;

■ signs of disorder and neglect, such as broken windows, abandoned vehicles or graffiti, are not removed at the earliest opportunity;

■ an organised human presence, such as police, security guards, street wardens or concierges, is absent.

A good quality public realm can stimulate the desirable level of human activity and influence the behaviour of users

● Proper attention to the design quality and attractiveness of the street increases its safety and use and promotes greater respect towards the environment.

● Improvements to the public realm should be approached in a strategic, co-ordinated way, as opposed to being ad-hoc.

● Town centre management – typically public/private partnership to promote the interests of local businesses and of the town centre in general – can promote the importance of urban design in creating places that are safe and vibrant.

■ **Town centre management and holistic streetscape improvements form the basis of the regeneration of Gravesend town centre. Stroud and Newcastle have also opted for design-led town centre management.**

■ The centrally located Park Ranger is one reason for the reduction in anti-social behaviour in Mowbray Park, Sunderland.

■ The street furniture in Newcastle both looks smart and is unobtrusive, allowing for surveillance along the full length of the street.

■ The Orchard, Fairford is an example of where an attractive public realm produces a safe and pleasant, as well as commercially-successful, place to live.

■ Disorder and neglect can lead to a spiral of decline that fosters crime.

■ Neighbourhood Watch is more of a deterrent if its existence is publicised.

■ A private security presence at the Bridges Centre, Sunderland, helps to create a feeling of safety.

■ The area adjacent to the Bridges Centre, Sunderland, benefits from a programmed maintenance regime.

■ The low crime levels of the car park and public space at @t-Bristol is in part a result of constant surveillance by around 75 CCTV cameras.

■ **At the Orchard, Fairford and Allcourt, Lechdale, a management trust is responsible for ground maintenance and a high quality public realm.**

The planning system can influence a range of management systems that help to make places look good and work well

- A programmed regime of a high level of cleaning and maintenance, be it undertaken by public, private or voluntary organisations, is more likely to achieve sustainable environments, partly by sending out a strong message about not tolerating vandalism. Cleaning and maintenance systems should include regular grass cutting, ground maintenance, and litter and graffiti removal.

- Secure storage of maintenance equipment and materials prevents offenders accessing what are often targets and tools for crime.

- Resident, community or business management organisations can help to instil a sense of ownership and responsibility in a neighbourhood (see also Ownership).

- Schemes such as Neighbourhood Watch encourage residents to take responsibility for providing surveillance of their own and their neighbours' properties.

- The presence of security staff can provide enough of a human deterrent to permit more imaginative and attractive planning and design solutions, but must be sustainable economically.

Checklist: Management and maintenance

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1	Has care been taken to create a good quality public realm?
2	Are appropriate facilities management systems in place? Does the design and layout support these?
3	Are users, businesses and residents involved in management?

3

The planning and crime prevention toolkit

The seven attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention have been discussed and illustrated in Chapter 2. This Chapter concerns how the planning toolkit is used to secure crime prevention and promote community safety. The focus is developing appropriate planning policies and using development control effectively.

Working in context

The policy context

Sound planning policies and effective development control are dependent on a good understanding of the context in which individual proposals will be considered. This context includes the statutory framework, national policies and local influences.

There are clear policy expectations. The new PPS1 has put crime prevention at the heart of the planning process. Other PPGs underline the importance of designing out crime and designing in community safety. For example, PPG3 (Housing), PPG6 (Town centres and retail developments), PPG13 (Transport) and PPG17 (Open space, sport and recreation).[2]

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 places a duty on each local authority to:

"without prejudice to any other obligation imposed upon it … to exercise its functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area".

Local planning authorities must therefore consider the likely effect on crime and disorder in their area when drawing up their planning policies, determining planning applications and discharging other planning responsibilities.

At the local level, a number of influences help establish the context. These can include:

- Community strategies (under the Local Government Act 2000);

- Crime and disorder reduction strategies, prepared by the crime and disorder reduction partnerships (under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998);

- Local transport plans (under the Transport Act 2000, including Accessibility planning); and

- Housing strategies.

Many local drivers to reduce crime and promote community safety are rooted in area regeneration initiatives. Planning policy, and delivery, must be open to influence by, as well as looking to shape, regeneration programmes to ensure cross-sectoral integration. The aim always is well-designed, sustainable places where communities can prosper.

Local geography

Planners need to be aware of the crime risks of a location and understand the effect of potential changes to the built environment before deciding on possible solutions and appropriate policy responses. There are a range of useful tools that may be usefully employed here, such as crime pattern analyses and crime risk assessment.

Crime pattern analysis — assessing the local situation

It is important that crime reduction-based planning measures are based upon a clear understanding of the local situation, avoiding making assumptions about the problems and their causes. This means gathering and analysing information on:

- what crimes are taking place and how often?
- how are the crimes being committed?
- where?
- when (time of day, day of the week, time of year)?
- why (what are the motives for offending, e.g. material, racial, territorial, alleviation of boredom)– who are the offenders?
- what vehicles/properties/victims are involved? and
- how are goods being disposed of?

The Home Office has created a series of toolkits to facilitate this process for a number of different types of crime. The toolkits are available at: www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/index.htm

Crime risk assessment in the planning process

Working closely with the police, planners need to be able to:

- identify the crime risks present in specific locations;
- identify likely consequences of those crimes for the community and for institutions, companies and individuals, including especially vulnerable individuals and groups;
- assess or take advice on priorities for crime reduction and other considerations;
- establish the likely causes of crime in a given area; and
- work out how they may be ameliorated or reduced through changes to the environment through the planning process.

The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (see page 10) can also be used to interpret crime patterns and help forecast risk.

Questions that might be asked as part of a crime risk assessment include:

- is the site in, or close to, a known crime hot spot or a 'honeypot'?
- does the area have characteristics — such as high child densities, unemployment or levels of drug abuse — that may make residents more likely to offend or be victims of crime?
- building on the guidance offered in this guide, does the existing layout of the built environment make crime and disorder more or less likely?

Whatever approach is used, the advice of the police should be sought as appropriate. The input of a police architectural liaison officer can include site visits, written reports, meetings or telephone conversations. Occasionally, such as at Wakefield, architectural liaison officers have been seconded to the local authority planning team; conversely, in Bradford a planning officer has been seconded to West Yorkshire Police.

Delivering good design in local solutions

It is important that good design is a consideration from the outset, and that the different professionals work together to develop solutions that encompass the broad objectives of sustainable communities. Those undertaking crime pattern analysis and crime risk assessments should be aware of positive benefits to be derived from working closely with designers from an early stage. Where designers gain an early understanding of the problems, it will be possible that, working closely with ALO's, they will be able to work up solutions that encompass the broad range of attributes that combine to make up sustainable communities.

- Design resources include good practice guidance such as *By Design*, and *Better Places to Live: By Design* that accompany Planning Policy Guidance.

- The Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment can offer enabling advice and best practice dissemination.

- RUDI (Resource for Urban Design Information) can be found at www.rudi.net

- The Centre for Education offers links to a number of Urban Design resources at www.cebe.cf.ac.uk/resources/links/udorg.html

Local development frameworks

Local development frameworks (LDFs), subject to
Parliamentary approval, will be introduced via the
Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill and
accompanying guidance, they will comprise a
folder of Local Development Documents (LDDs)
which will provide the framework for delivering the
spatial planning strategy for the area. Development
Plan Documents (DPDs) will form part of the
statutory development plan, which will continue to
be the starting point in the consideration of
planning applications for the development or use of
land. The main components of development plan
documents will be:

- Core strategy

- Site-specific allocations of land

- Area action plans (where needed)

- Proposals map (with Inset maps, where
  necessary)

DPDs will be supported, if local planning authorities
decide to have them, by Supplementary Planning
Documents (SPD). SPD will be included in the LDF
and form part of the planning framework for the
area and could include area and topic-based
guidance, as well as detailed planning briefs. They
will not be subject to independent examination and
will not form part of the statutory Development Plan.
However, they will be subject to rigorous
procedures of community engagement in
accordance with the authority's statement of
community involvement and can be material
considerations of significant weight in the
determination of planning applications.

Core strategy

The main purpose of the core strategy is to set out
the key elements of the planning framework for the
area. It is likely to comprise a vision and strategic
objectives for the area, along with a spatial strategy,
a number of core policies and a monitoring and
implementation framework. The attributes of safe,
sustainable environments considered in Chapter 2
can help describe the sort of places that local
authorities want to prompt through positive
planning. They can be part of the vision local
authorities, working with their communities,
set out in the core strategy.

The core strategy will also contain a set of clearly
expressed policies. These will apply across the
whole of the local planning authority's area, or to
locations, but generally not to individual sites which
will be dealt with under site specific proposals.
These policies should help deliver the vision and
reflect the unique circumstances of a particular
area. The emphasis given to crime prevention
should be what is appropriate locally.

Area action plans

Area Action Plans will be used to provide a planning
framework for significant areas of change and areas
of conservation. They are likely to include areas of
planned growth and where regeneration is to be
stimulated. The contribution made by planning to
sustainable communities is likely to figure in area
action plans where new development is shaping
places.

Statements of community involvement

These Statements will set out the local planning
authority's policy for the community in the
preparation and revision of local plan documents,
and in significant development control decisions.
Local planning authorities should, as a matter of
best practice, seek to enlist the views of those
voluntary bodies involved in crime prevention, such
as Neighbourhood Watch co-ordinators, and local
strategic partnerships as well as the police.

The effective involvement of stakeholders is crucial
to proper consideration of crime prevention
measures, and to securing local ownership of a
proposed development. In addition to consultation
in the preparation of the LDF, early consultation
with local communities on specific proposals
generates a greater sense of ownership and
increased likelihood of positive action in
addressing crime.

Supplementary planning documents

There are several ways in which local authorities
can develop policies into clear design ideas for
particular areas and sites. This is especially the
case in regeneration programmes. These are set
out more fully in By Design, and may include:

- Development briefs – these set out in detail
  how a local planning authority's policies should
  be implemented on a specific site; and

- Urban Design Frameworks – these provide
  guidance for areas undergoing change, or where
  growth and change needs to be promoted.

Both approaches are an excellent opportunity to
express expectations for crime prevention measures
at the very local level. A good development brief will
include an analysis of crime risk and patterns
(outlined below) and specify the kinds of responses
that would be expected. For example,
Huntingdonshire DC's Oxmoor Area Action Plan
analyses the issues …

*"whilst the layout of Oxmoor provides
opportunities for pedestrian movement free from
vehicular intrusion, the isolation of these routes
makes them feel lonely and dangerous for walkers,
especially in the evening or on dark days. Similarly,
unlit garage courts behind housing do not provide
a very secure solution … residents cannot see
their cars"*

…before setting out a range of solutions.

Writing policies

Over-elaborate plan-making and unnecessary policies should be avoided. Planning policies on crime prevention should not be mere words of encouragement but set precise expectations. It should be quite clear what is expected from developer's proposals, both in terms of location and quality. Every core strategy should have at least one general policy, to help deliver planning's contribution to crime prevention and community safety.

Checklist of points to consider when writing a general policy on planning out crime:

1	does the policy reflect not duplicate national guidance?
2	is the policy applicable to all development proposals, or should the policy specify possible solutions to particular problems and consider different land uses?
3	should the policy highlight conflicting priorities that planning for crime prevention might encounter, and encourage alternative responses?
4	does the policy contribute to wider objectives of good urban design?
5	does the policy specify whether certain crime prevention measures should only be considered on certain types/sizes of development?

For example:
Development proposals will be expected to have regard for the objectives of 'planning out crime' through the incorporation of measures such as:

- promotion of mixed use development and other schemes that increase the range of activities that maximise the opportunities for surveillance;
- maximising the amount of defensible space which is controlled, or perceived to be controlled, by occupiers;
- a high standard of street lighting.

(adapted from Walsall UDP)

If a general policy is robust enough to apply to the full range of place and development types, it should not be necessary to have additional policies. There will be occasions, however, where it may be necessary to produce policies that require something specific and particular to prevent crime or tackle disorder. Much will depend on the characteristics of the local situation and the change envisaged, or being promoted, through the LDF. These more specific policies will include topic specific and site or area-specific policies.

Topic-specific policies

Topic-specific policies could be required to focus the planning response to particular aspects of crime or disorder. These may either be incorporated in a DPD or be the subject of a SPD. Policies might apply to different types of crime (e.g. street crime or car crime) or crime reduction measures (e.g. lighting or CCTV) or type of development (e.g. housing). Examples include Westminster's Guide to Siting Security Cameras and Birmingham's supplementary planning guidance on Shop Front Security. Examples such as Dudley guide on Design for Community Safety are also interesting because they apply wider guidance to a local setting.

Area or site-specific policies

Area or site-specific policies may be required to focus the planning response to particular locations with specific crime or disorder concerns. In such cases, the local context requires an approach that is different from that generally applicable to the local authority area as a whole and requires a specific policy to achieve this. An example is the chapter in Camden's UDP which is dedicated to the King's Cross Opportunity Area and sets out specific requirements for new development. Critically, the UDP and its policies for the Opportunity Area are supported by a detailed design guide which supplements and fleshes out the plan to help secure effective implementation.

Checklist of points to consider when writing specific policies on planning out crime:

1	is the policy needed?
2	does the policy genuinely respond to a specific issue and context rather than just restating general policy?
3	does the policy complement general planning policy and national guidance?
4	would implementation of the policy be helped by supporting supplementary guidance?

Bristol City Council and the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, under the auspices of the Bristol Community Safety Partnership, have produced *Designing Out Crime: protocol for liaison between Police and Planners*. This useful document includes information on when and how the two should work together, and is a model for local authorities and constabularies around the country.

Development control is pivotal in implementing planning policies to prevent crime. The different stages of the planning application process should be managed effectively to deliver safe, sustainable development.

The pre-application stage

Developers, designers and those seeking planning permission should enter into discussions with a range of interested parties before the application is submitted. Pre-application discussions should expose any potential conflicts in meeting any crime and urban design objectives arising from a proposal, the resolution of which should result in higher quality planning applications and speedier decisions. In addition to taking heed of local and national policies, applicants should be encouraged to talk through aspects of their proposals with the local community, the planning authority and the police.

Advice should be sought from the police architectural liaison officer on all aspects of crime prevention, including possible local causes of crime, the desirability of certain facilities or linkages in the local context, and detailed design considerations. The basis for any discussions should be set by the local planning authority's crime prevention policies. Local authorities may find it beneficial to set out those instances where it would recommend an applicant to engage in pre-application discussions with the police.

Police advice should be considered in the context of this guide along with wider planning objectives, and should be an important factor in discussions between the applicant and the local authority.

Planning application stage

All planning applications should demonstrate how crime prevention measures have been considered. This should be part of the applicant's design statement, and could usefully reflect each of the attributes of safe, sustainable places introduced in this guide.

Local authorities may find it beneficial to agree thresholds with the police on when their advice should be sought, including on whether a specific crime risk assessment is required. Triggers could include location (such as town centre or adjacent to a known crime hot spot), type (such as pubs and clubs or car parks) and size (such as number of new homes).

The Kent Constabulary has developed a system by which ALOs can inspect local authorities' weekly planning lists to assess for possible concerns. Triggers include:

- high crime area;
- likely impact on police;
- ATM — cash machine;
- major development.

The planning decision

Crime prevention can be a material consideration in the determination of planning applications. Local planning authorities should consider whether proposed development could be amended or planning conditions imposed that would contribute to the prevention of crime and disorder. Where proposed development would undermine crime prevention or the promotion of community safety and the concerns are relevant to land use planning, the application could be refused planning permission where refusal is consistent with the development plan.

Any planning decision involves balancing (or preferably, resolving creatively) sometimes competing objectives. This is no less the case when crime prevention is involved. The decision-taker must give appropriate weight to each objective and material consideration. The balance to be struck will depend on the policies in the development plan and specifics of each case. But crime prevention considerations should be given weight where the potential crime risk is shown or expected to be high and, or, the consequences for the community, vulnerable groups and individuals serious.

Planning conditions

Where crime prevention or the fear of crime is material to a proposed development, local planning authorities may wish to consider planning conditions to secure measures that reduce the possibility of crime, provided they fulfil the tests set out in DoE Circular 11/95. These require that conditions should be necessary, relevant to planning, relevant to the development to be permitted, enforceable, precise and reasonable in all other respects. Local planning authorities should not attempt to introduce planning conditions for a non-planning purpose. An example would be where a condition requires the provision or improvement of crime prevention measures that are not relevant to the proposed development.

Conditions may be appropriate if a potential criminal act would have an adverse effect on the use or potential use of land. Such situations may include, but are not limited to:

- Where it is necessary to ensure that a dwelling is fit to live in, because high crime rates have resulted in the abandonment of residential accommodation;

- Where the intended occupants or users of a development are particularly vulnerable and so require higher standards of security or personal safety justifying specific crime prevention measures; for example, accommodation or facilities for the elderly, nurseries, schools and health centres;

- Where the intended use of a development raises significant community safety issues linked to crime prevention, for example public car parks and outdoor leisure uses such as swimming pools and sports pitches;

- Where it is necessary to require crime prevention measures for construction sites because they are both vulnerable to crime and raise community safety issues e.g. requirements could relate to site fencing and securing plant and materials.

It may be appropriate to impose conditions that address crime prevention and community safety when considering access, site layout (including play areas and parking arrangements), lighting, noise, opening hours and landscape design. Many of these aspects will be relevant to both residential and commercial developments.

It may also be appropriate to consider a requirement that lighting should conform to a particular specification or whether or not lights should be attached to buildings to provide extra security. Additional matters such as the installation of CCTV systems or security shutters may also be proper considerations, particularly for commercial schemes.

Note:
_____

[3] This condition will not be suitable where the mounting will overhang a highway unless the highway authority is willing to grant a licence under s.177 of the Highways Act 1980. However it may be appropriate where lighting is required for unadopted paths, a private car park or servicing area of a development.

_____

Example planning conditions

Whilst local planning authorities should not normally prescribe matters of detailed design, there may be circumstances when it is acceptable to consider imposing a condition requiring particular target hardening measures to be incorporated in a development. Some models of acceptable conditions that may be used in appropriate circumstances include:

CCTV, shutters and other security measures

- a scheme showing the details of CCTV and/or security measures/shutters to be installed at the development shall be submitted to and approved by the local planning authority in writing. [No part of the development] [the use] hereby permitted shall be [occupied] [not be commenced] before the scheme is carried out as approved;

- [no part of the development shall be occupied] [the use shall not commence] until CCTV/security measures/shutters have been installed as indicated on drawing *** or in accordance with BS 7958:1999;

Door sets/windows

- the standards of [External door sets][Windows] [to be installed] [on the ground floor/basement floor of the buildings] in the buildings shall be made secure to standards, independently certified, set out in [BSI PAS 24-1:1999 'Doors for enhanced Security'] [BS 7950 'Windows for enhanced security'];

Locks

- the standards of Locks to be installed in [external doors/windows of] the buildings [or specify parts of the buildings] shall be made secure to standards set out in BS 3621:1998 (or any superseding standard);

Street lighting

- the standards of street lighting to be installed shall be made to standards set out in BS5489;

- any streetlighting to be mounted on the development shall be installed in accordance with details to be approved in writing by the local planning authority and shall be maintained as approved thereafter.[3]

In cases where it is either inappropriate or simply not possible to impose a valid condition relating to such details, local planning authorities should consider including informatives on planning permissions drawing the applicant's attention to particular guidance on crime prevention or to technical publications that deal with security measures.

Section 106 agreements

The use of planning obligations, which are usually made by means of an agreement with the local planning authority, under s.106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, may be appropriate in certain cases, such as where a planning objection to a proposal cannot be overcome by the imposition of a condition. However, planning obligations should be relevant to planning and directly related to the proposed development. More detailed guidance is given in Department of the Environment Circular 1/97. The content of such obligations will be dependent upon the circumstances of each case but it may be reasonable to seek a planning obligation to create a safer environment within the area of the proposed development, such as through the provision of CCTV, neighbourhood wardens or late-night bus services.

Annex 1
The case studies

This Annex provides details about the case studies which have been examined in the course of preparing the guide. These areas are selected to highlight the attributes of safer places. Readers are reminded that they are not templates to be reproduced elsewhere. Rather, they illustrate how stakeholders (including local planning authorities, the police, the community and designers) have worked together to generate particular responses to specific local problems. The way that those involved in the producing and managing the places that follow have thought through some of the difficult issues that arise when planning for crime reduction is intended to be an inspiration to others.

The case studies were selected by the Project Team and Steering Group following suggestions from a range of police and planning sources and an exhaustive trawl of possible sites throughout England. In each case, the local police force was contacted for general impressions of the scheme and for specific crime data to confirm the effectiveness of the measures taken in reducing crime. The case studies have been written up following site visits and discussions with those responsible for designing the places that should, in time, continue to be both safe and sustainable.

The information presented for each of the case studies includes, in addition to a brief description of the site, the process involved and key factors in creating a safe and sustainable environment.

A contact point is also provided for readers who wish to follow up any of the issues raised in greater detail.

Housing	Cromer Street, Camden Northview, Swanley Royds, Bradford The Orchard, Fairford and Allcourt, Lechlade Bishop's Mead, Chelmsford
Town centres	Newcastle-upon-Tyne Gravesend Stroud
Retail	The Bridges Centre, Sunderland
Leisure	@t-Bristol, Bristol
Commercial	Heywood Distribution Park, Greater Manchester
Health	West Road Health Centre, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Education	Parr's Wood Technology College, Greater Manchester
Park	Mowbray Park, Sunderland
Mixed-use development	Clarence Mews, Hackney
Car park	@t-Bristol, Bristol
Transport	Birkenhead bus station

Cromer Street
Camden

Overview

The Cromer Street area formed part of the King's Cross Action Development Area that benefited from Government Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) funding for major renewal, the bulk of which took place between 1994 and 1999.

The area had been seriously affected by drug dealing, prostitution, vandalism and burglaries, which, in turn, produced depressed housing conditions and poor street environments. The changes, reflected in reduced crime figures, have transformed the quality of the urban environment and the lives of residents and businesses.

A major feature of the transformation is the enclosure of the courtyards between buildings. These are now dedicated to residents for play space, gardens or parking, with a concierge entrance for each block.

Context

The area — just to the south of King's Cross station — is the centre of a £29million SRB area. It comprises post-war medium-rise flat blocks. The wider area is a mixed use neighbourhood of older tenement blocks and terraced properties, post war housing, institutional buildings, shops and offices. The location had played a large part in the degree of crime. Easy access into the flat blocks provided opportunities for criminals and a subsequent decline in housing conditions. Disused undercroft storage areas, unsupervised entrances and staircases, poor lighting and the permeability of the grounds all contributed to the problems.

Despite the crime and poor conditions, the potential of the area was recognised, with housing stock capable of providing further service and generous areas of open space.

Process

Backed by community involvement (residents, schools, businesses) and guided by a Master Plan, plus advice from the CPDA and the community beat officer, physical works included:

- Renovation of housing with concierge entrances, CCTV at entries linked to each flat, lifts extended to reach basements and conversion of storage to community uses, such as nurseries and day centres for older people.

- Enclosure of the ground floor space between blocks, with railings and gates allowing views in and out but preventing uncontrolled entry. One area is a through route, open to the public during daylight to avoid isolation. Other areas are playgrounds, parking space and gardens.

- Improved paving, planting and lighting.

- Formation of gathering places with seats.

- Provision of play equipment for children.

■ **Security improvements in Cromer Street, before and after.**

Outcome

Cromer Street is now a thriving, well-functioning inner city housing area, well integrated with the mixed use and open spaces around. The park is naturally self-policing, with straight through views, and overlooking from the flats around. It is closed at dusk, as are gates into other areas between flats. The flats are well cared for. There is very little graffiti. There are meeting places and activities along Cromer Street, centred on the shops that serve a community function. Entry to flats is by way of a two-stage entry system at the gate and at the door.

CCTV, surveys the entire King's Cross Estate Area, which is monitored at an estate office.

There is evidence of crime displacement to surrounding, largely non-residential, areas, although crime has been diluted. The improved environment is reflected in residents exercising their right to buy.

■ **The improved neighbourhood park is busy and overlooked by numerous households.**

■ **Low planting has taken place in the privatised spaces, improving the environment as well as security.**

■ **Four elements crucial to the success of Cromer Street: fences, lighting, CCTV and refurbished properties.**

Northview
Swanley

Overview

An inclusive partnership approach was taken to the remodelling of Swanley's Northview estate, based around landscape improvements. Secured by Design principles were used in a wide variety of ways, with the aims of defining and engendering ownership, controlling access and 'target hardening'. The resulting improvements to the environment have reduced crime and led to major improvements in residents' quality of life.

Context

The estate comprises ten blocks of 1970s three-storey housing. By the mid 1990s, these had a very poor environment. The outside public areas, lacking clear areas of responsibility, had become particularly troublesome.

In response, the West Kent Housing Association commenced a programme of regeneration. The architect worked in conjunction with the ALO and a steering group of local residents to transform the environment, resulting in a dramatic fall in crime.

The communal space between blocks has been altered, with some areas given to the responsibility of ground floor flat residents and the remaining communal areas separated from the road and with defined uses.

The communal areas are actively used by the residents, but there is no exclusion. The playgrounds, for example, are accessible to children from other areas. There are no through routes or traffic within the area.

Process

The design aimed to produce security, sense of place and pride in community. It was achieved through creating:

A sense of neighbourhood to each courtyard between blocks with an entrance portal and colour theming

- A low fence along the road frontage
- Parking areas
- Secure stores and waste bin stores
- Metal railings to define gardens dedicated to ground floor flats
- Tiled and gated balconies with new balustrades
- Secluded gardens
- Children's play areas and equipment
- Controlled access to flats with entrance canopy
- Good quality lighting
- Landscaping with trees and hedges
- A triple fence at the rear boundary (vertical timber boarded fence either side of weld mesh core)
- Substantial wooden bollards to prevent vehicle encroachment.

■ **Function, amenity and security applied to anonymous space.**

Outcome

The outcome was an improved sense of community and morale, and a reduction in crime that was rewarded in 1997 with the Institute of Housing National Award for Housing and Security.

The current situation shows that the environmental improvements were sufficiently robust to withstand the extensive use to which they have been subject. The areas are functioning as intended and surveillance from overlooking is good.

The trees and hedges are maturing and the grass is well maintained.

Between September 1996 and September 2000 there was reduction in all types of crime – over 80% in the case of the most recorded types: criminal damage, theft from motor vehicle and theft offences.

■ **Secluded play space is overlooked by housing, segregated from parking and protected by fencing.**

■ **A buffer zone has been created between the buildings and footpaths.**

■ **Security is provided at the entry to each block.**

Royds
Bradford

■ **Typical Royds neighbourhood before regeneration.**

Overview

Royds is a successful application of Secured by Design principles, achieved within the financial restraints of a regeneration programme. Key aspects of the process included the formation of a Community Association to control and administer the programme, consultation with residents, the close involvement of the Bradford District Architectural Liaison Officer, who worked in partnership with an architect committed to urban regeneration and the principles of Secured by Design. Redesign of the public realm, distinguishing public space from private, the creation of defensible space, the introduction of community facilities, and target hardening (in the form of burglar resistant windows and doors, railings, burglar alarms) contributed to a major improvement in residents' satisfaction with their environment – and a plummeting crime rate.

Context

Royds comprises three districts on the edge of the Bradford urban area, 5 kilometres from the city centre. It has been subject to a £31m Single Regeneration Budget programme that funded extensive renovation of 1588 low rise, post war local authority dwellings and the introduction of replacement housing association developments, including community centres, sheltered housing and recreation facilities.

In 1995, the area was one of the worst in the UK for house burglaries: 138 forced entries per 1000 households, seven times the current national average. The area was run down with houses and infrastructure in poor state of repair and with serious social deprivation (47% unemployment). The subsequent regeneration provided the opportunity for Secured by Design principles to be introduced, which allows local residents to influence their environment.

Process

Local people led the programme from the outset, and crime was a priority for the 12 democratically elected residents of the Community Association's board. A bus was used as a mobile consultation venue, as residents were too worried about burglary to leave their homes. Residents decided on the location of social facilities and the security of individual houses, following detailed analysis of burglar behaviour.

Private space was created and clearly defined with metal railings and gates. Rear alleys, garage courts, and unused public open space behind dwellings were removed, incorporating the space into rear gardens. Priority was also given to the closure of damaging connections that were largely detached from the road network.

■ **Complementary elements of the Royds approach to Secured by Design.**

New development aimed to create small and identifiable communities, promoting social cohesion and reinforcing neighbourliness, and allowing the identification of strangers.

Outcome

As well as the clear environmental improvements, the programme had social impacts creating employment for young people and improving access to the job market for residents by providing experience and training. It also provided the first use of performance related standards for door and window design based on attack resistance.

The creation of defensible space and the clear definition and robust separation of private and public space provides residents, among other advantages, with the confidence to challenge strangers and, if necessary, call the police.

The ALO reports that there has not been a single forcible entry on any of the refurbished properties. Including the properties in the Royds regeneration area that have not been refurbished, the last five years have seen a fall of 69% in dwelling burglary and 58% in all burglary.

■ **The perimeter fence that surrounds part of the improved area is of largely symbolic value.**

■ **Secured by Design has been applied on a house by house basis, including in-curtilage parking wherever possible.**

■ **Formerly anonymous space has been replaced by specific uses dictated by residents.**

The Orchard
Lechlade
& Allcourt
Fairford

Overview

These two developments, by the same housebuilder, demonstrate in a rural setting that secure housing developments do not have to resort to high profile or defensive security measures to make them safe.

Instead, the emphasis has been on the design of buildings and the spaces between them, which set out to create a sense of community, ownership and security.

Context

This case study includes two residential developments in neighbouring Cotswold towns: the Orchard in Fairford, and Allcourt in Lechlade which are aimed at those seeking early retirement.

Good quality vernacular architectural styles have created popular places that knit into their surroundings so that they become part of the existing built fabric. Simple design features ensure that people passing through understand what

spaces they can and cannot legitimately enter and that they are likely to be observed.

As well as the design solutions, there are very high levels of management and maintenance. Furthermore, at the Orchard, the staff who live on site double up as proxy security guards.

The developments have had to respond to the sensitive semi-rural setting, as well as the Local Plan policy promoting Secured by Design.

Process

The Orchard in Fairford was designed largely with aesthetics in mind. Planning permission had initially been refused due to design considerations. The revised design sought to connect the development to its surroundings whilst giving the impression of being a private cul-de-sac, discouraging the presence of anyone without a purpose.

Allcourt in Lechlade involved more detailed consideration. The houses front a newly created village green with footpaths across to an edge of town centre location. Designing out the fear of crime

■ On-site offices are staffed by Trust employees, providing security and a feeling of safety amongst residents.

was an important consideration and consultation took place with the ALO. The developer also worked with the Council's urban design department to ensure a sensitive layout was created. Critical issues were overlooking, boundary treatment, use of levels and open space management.

Outcome

A non-profit Trust maintains the buildings and grounds, and arranges refuse collection. Simple management measures are encouraged throughout the development. For example, keeping cars parked in garages makes it hard to identify which properties are occupied. The Trust's secretaries also provide low-key security.

Building layouts engender a sense of community. Each property is overlooked by neighbours.

■ The improved neighbourhood park is busy and overlooked by numerous households.

■ Signs are one of the techniques used to create defensible space without erecting physical barriers.

Intruders can be visibly recognised. Strong landscaping, rather than walls and fences, defines public and private space.

Both schemes contain a high standard of streetscape works: street furniture, landscaping, lighting and paving. The use of gravel drives at Allcourt acts as a deterrent against crime as the noise created by footsteps on the gravel can be heard from properties.

Crime rates are low. The Orchard, for example, has had no recorded burglaries in the three years since completion.

■ The houses are a modern interpretation of a traditional type. Terraced housing is one of the safest forms, provided that rear access is denied.

Bishop's Mead
Chelmsford

Overview

Modern volume house building, particularly on greenfield sites, has not always been synonymous with either safety or sustainability, and rarely with both. But Bishop's Mead in Chelmsford's Chancellor Park urban extension, is on the way to succeeding on both counts.

Based on a traditional street pattern and designed to maximise natural surveillance, Bishop's Mead is an appropriate response to the challenge set. The scheme is an example of how skilful design can reconcile the diverse requirements of various recommendations and achieve an intrinsically safe environment. It could be a model for the major housebuilding effort that is required in large parts of England over the coming decades.

Context

Bishop's Mead is a new, 'greenfield' residential development within the larger development of Chancellor Park, on the eastern fringe of Chelmsford. It follows the traditional design of houses within the adjacent conservation area.

The 59-home development ranges from 1 bedroom flats to 5 bedroom houses. The design of houses reflects a number of vernacular styles, meaning that within a small area there is a very wide range of plan forms, storey heights, roof details, roof and wall materials, windows and colours.

The layout is based on most houses having road frontage, continuous facades and a compact street section, reminiscent of a traditional market town.

Process

Chelmsford District Council, seeking improvements on earlier stages of Chancellor Park, insisted on a rigorous application of the Essex Design Guide and PPG3 for Bishop's Mead. The architects, Reeves Bailey Associates, visited local towns to study the vernacular and achieve the required affinity to buildings within the adjoining conservation area. The designers created a diversity of forms and styles within a traditional street pattern.

The layout is a product of:

- Essex Design Guide
- Local Authority adoption criteria
- Concessions to car ownership and other marketing concerns
- PPG 3 (density is 33 dwellings per hectare)
- Response to vernacular characteristics
- Security concerns

■ **The block form provides mutual surveillance of internal spaces.**

Outcome

Security concerns have led to the following solutions:

- Rear gardens enclosed by continuous building frontage to streets
- Gates at entrances to garage courtyards and at individual parking spaces in front of garages
- Overlooking of gardens, courtyards and streets
- Clear distinction between private and public space
- Limited use of segregated footpaths

The layout has achieved a safe environment based on a traditional urban layout, with concessions to car ownership that have been successfully resolved.

■ **High walls and gates protect parking courts.**

■ **Railings, walls and gates provide a clear distinction between public and private space.**

The project received a project award in the Housing Design Awards 2000 and a Chelmsford Society Award.

Crime rates are approximately half the rate for a comparator part of Chancellor Park (of the same size and developed at the same time, although to a more common suburban layout).

■ **The block form also enables the construction of dwellings that have few sides exposed to the public realm, which are less likely to be burgled.**

Newcastle City Centre

Key Success Factors

- City centre management supporting a strong retail core in centre of compact, easily accessible, city centre

- Major improvements to the built environment, especially historic elements and public spaces

- Increased activity at all times

- A range of non–planning measures

Key Facts

Date of Development
1990s to present

Lead Designer
Newcastle City Council

Developer
various

Local Authority
Newcastle City Council

Police Force
Northumbria Police Constabulary

Area of Analysis
10 hectares approx

Contact details
David Usher, City Centre Manager,
0191 211 5501,
david.usher@newcastle.gov.uk

Overview

Newcastle City Centre is a compact area of mostly Georgian and Victorian Streets providing a high quality urban environment of exceptional architectural interest. Eldon Square Shopping Centre is the largest city centre shopping centre in the country. A regeneration programme in the historic Grainger Town area has restored facades, provided good quality paving, lighting and advanced CCTV. The City's Quayside has also undergone redevelopment and is now an important commercial, leisure and residential area. There is good public transport including the Metro light rail system. It can be a model for city and town centres of all sizes.

Context

Newcastle has a robust urban structure, which provides the foundation for a strong feeling of safety. The restoration work of the Georgian streets — stone cleaning, windows and doors reinstated to original form, unsightly shopfront advertising removed, buildings repaired — has reinstated a very strong sense of civic pride and created a less welcoming environment for crime.

The flat-fronted Georgian facades with few recesses and straight streets contribute to the efficient operation of CCTV, as well as providing natural legibility and pedestrian permeability through the introduction of partly pedestrianised, partly bus-only access areas.

Crime and anti-social behaviour problems — including vagrancy, street vending, drunkenness and football-related incidents — have been a cause for concern.

In 1996, Newcastle became one of the first places to employ a City Centre Manager.

Process

The Grainger Town Partnership Area improvements have included:

- Restoration of building facades

- Introduction of residential use above shops

- Pedestrian priority applied to some streets

- New granite footpath paving and other street repaving work

- Building-mounted street lighting

- Removal of clutter (excess street notices, lamp posts, signposts)

- Upgraded CCTV system, controlled by the police and staffed 24 hours

- Continuing cleaning and maintenance

- Investment in public spaces and realm, increasing pedestrian priority

■ Grainger Town has been reanimated by specific measures, such as outdoor cafes, to create eyes on the street.

A City Centre Crime Prevention Panel of public and private interests meets monthly to discuss crime figures, hotspots and problems.

The planning measures are backed up by a range of other strategies, including: an Exclusion Scheme where known criminals are banned from particular shops; a radio link between 170 city centre companies and the police; and 'Pub Watch' CCTV scheme.

Outcome

These measures have contributed to Newcastle's position at the forefront of the urban renaissance. It is an attractive shopping destination by day and is active in the evening because of numerous bars and restaurants, and growing residential use. New developments have fostered a feeling of pride amongst those living and working in the area. Visitor numbers are growing, with hotels approaching capacity.

Given the number of visitors compared to a relatively small residential population, the local police view the city centre to be a safe environment.

The statistics bear this out. Overall, crime has fallen by 25% over the last three years, with robbery down by 48%, shop theft by 23%, commercial burglary by 19% and drug offences by 10%. Each of these reductions contrasts with the wider trend for Northumbria Police.

■ A very high quality environment that attracts visitors creates the ideal conditions for natural surveillance.

■ Mixed use development, in this case homes, studios, offices and leisure, provides the ownership and surveillance that round-the-clock usage brings.

Gravesend Town Centre

The combination of national regeneration funding regimes and a strong commitment from Gravesham Borough Council and Kent Constabulary has regenerated the town centre. The regeneration effort is two-pronged: good quality physical improvements and town centre management. This combination of factors has resulted in a reduction in crime and an improved environment for residents and visitors to the town centre.

Overview

Gravesham Borough Council is a Beacon Council for town centre regeneration for the work it is leading in Gravesend. It demonstrates the value of investment in struggling town centres in the fight against crime.

This has been done by improving the general quality of the entire town centre, as well as focussing on particularly troublesome sites. At all times, an emphasis has been placed on partnership working.

This case study illustrates the benefits of striving to achieve 'a living place'.

Context

With the decline of its port-related activities, Gravesend suffered from dereliction, empty commercial buildings and decaying heritage buildings. There was a lack of pride and a growing crime and disorder problem.

Process

The regeneration programme has proceeded with funding from English Partnerships and the SRB, matched by local sources and Section 106 agreements. It has included:

- Conservation and restoration of heritage buildings.
- Development proposals for sites vulnerable to crime, such as car parks.
- Reintroduction of housing to the riverside and town centre including "living over the shop".
- Creating pedestrian priority shopping streets including good quality paving and street furniture.

An essential component of the programme was the formation of the town centre management group, Towncentric, which co-ordinates services, including:

- Radio contact between retailers and the police and CCTV surveillance
- Daily street cleaning
- Town centre wardens
- Police patrols
- Information collection and analysis
- Introduction of G-SAFE crime initiative

■ Opportunities for illegal activities are reduced by the restoration of heritage buildings.

Outcome

Crime reduction has resulted from active measures such as radio links and CCTV and passive measures such as the restoration of derelict buildings and good quality urban design, leading to increased local pride in the town centre.

The derelict buildings that in the past provided an opportunity for crime and shelter for illegal activities have now largely disappeared.

Natural surveillance has been increased by a number of means, including the introduction of housing within the town centre and overlooking

the river walk and approaches, new uses for derelict premises and increased activity throughout the day — such as a 24-hour supermarket.

The absence of graffiti and litter reflects a new pride in the centre and an unwelcoming environment for criminal and disorderly conduct.

Between 1999/00 and 2001/02, shop theft fell by 19% and criminal damage by 8% (as opposed to a Force increase of 13%).

■ Activity and surveillance are encouraged throughout the day and night by allowing traffic into the pedestrian area in the evenings.

■ Towncentric, the town centre management group, is an essential contributor to town regeneration and crime reduction.

■ Shopping facilities are combined with places to play and sit.

Stroud Town Centre

Key Success Factors
■ Promotion of activity in the town centre
■ Excellent streetscape improvements
■ A strong public private partnership approach
■ Creative use of the criminal justice system

Key Facts

Date of Development
1997

Lead Designer
Stroud District Council

Developer
various

Local Authority
Stroud District Council

Police Force
Gloucestershire Constabulary

Area of Analysis
14.7 ha

Contact details
Vicky Hancock, Town Centre Manager,
01453 767894
tcm@stroudtown.fsnet.co.uk

Overview

The improvements to Stroud town centre show how planning can be used as a successful weapon against anti-social behaviour and crime against shops. The abuse of alcohol in public areas was seriously affecting the quality of life of other residents and impacting on businesses.

A combination of streetscape improvements, CCTV and enforcement measures has changed the nature of the town centre by reducing crime and anti-social behaviour.

Context

Stroud has a pleasant town centre that has suffered from high levels of crime and anti-social behaviour. In particular, there have been problems associated with street drinking, begging, drug addiction and shoplifting.

A range of organisations, including the local authority and the police, enabled the transformation of the town centre. Key amongst these has been the Town Centre Crime and Disorder Group, which

allows the key public, private and voluntary agencies to take ownership of the town's crime reduction efforts.

In addition to the planning processes discussed below, the criminal justice system was also used at the local level. A bylaw passed in 2000 to make street drinking illegal has had a major impact. Troublesome venues have been closed and a 'Behave or be Banned' policy exists in licensed premises. The Home Office has funded CCTV.

Process

A holistic approach to planning out crime has been taken in Stroud, including:

- Public realm improvements incorporating the redevelopment of the town square, maintaining the cleanliness of the town centre, signposting and permanent public art.

- Efforts to increase activity in the town centre: events, a farmers market, living over the shop and reusing derelict buildings.

- Building the identity of the town centre by promoting its civic design strengths and theming quarters with locally-relevant motifs. A database of local artists exists for public art projects.

- Installing CCTV, controlled by a central office and connected to a police radio system. In order to reduce negative visual impact, cameras are housed in small domes.

- Good quality street lighting.

- Constructing a Skate Park, removing a perceived nuisance from the town centre.

■ **Street cafes put eyes on the street.**

Outcome

The improvements have reinforced a strong community feel in the town centre. The street furniture is of high quality design on a common theme.

Young people still congregate in the town centre on weekend evenings. They do not, however, cause problems and the town has succeeded in encouraging increased and varied activities for all residents outside normal shopping hours.

There has also been an increase in the number of residential units and business investment in the town centre, increasing activity and natural surveillance at all times.

■ **Distinctive signage is just one of many improvements to public space that have crime reduction as an objective.**

■ **CCTV cameras are prominent but sensitive to the historic location.**

Stroud's improvements are reflected in crime figures. There have been no robberies in the last two years. In the same period, burglary has halved from 51 to 25 incidents per year and shop theft has fallen by a quarter. Car crime remains very low.

■ **The Town Centre Manager has succeeded in bringing colour and life to its main streets.**

The Bridges Shopping Centre
Sunderland

Overview

The Bridges Shopping Centre has been improved and extended since originating in the early 1970s as a pedestrianised centre. There were numerous connections to adjoining streets, making the centre a through route from several directions. This feature remains in the present centre and contributes to the activity. Another feature remaining from the original design are three residential tower blocks above the centre.

Security is enhanced by the strong management groups in place, security staff, CCTV and surveillance of surrounding streets from the tower blocks, rather than any specific design features.

Context

The Bridges Centre is situated at the heart of Sunderland City Centre. The main entrance and only significant street frontage is onto Market Square and the High Street. The railway station, metrolinks and the transport interchange are a short distance from this entrance. Parking for about 1000 cars is in multi storey structures and roof top deck.

Pedestrian permeability (when the centre is open – it closes in the evening) is very high, contributing to a high level of activity within the centre. The tower blocks have views of most of the approaches to the Centre and provide mounting points for high quality long range CCTV monitored by the Police. 160 cameras within the centre are monitored within the management office. Most crime within the centre is retail related, such as shoplifting and credit card fraud.

Process

The large-scale redevelopment of the Bridges has been undertaken in recent years by the owners, Land Securities PLC. The open malls of the original centre were roofed over in the late 1980s. Subsequently, a £40million expansion of 250,000 sq ft opened in September 2000. In 2001, a further smaller extension of six units and an improved entrance was completed.

The improvements have been carried out in the context of the regeneration of Sunderland City Centre led by One North East and the City of Sunderland, supported by the Single Regeneration Budget. A component of this programme has been the formation of Sunderland City Centre Management, the town centre management partnership that is actively maintaining environmental quality and security.

■ **Security staff patrol the well lit, bright interior.**

Outcome

The Bridges is a successful shopping destination serving the centre of Sunderland and supplements the High Street shopping. A distinct design theme runs through the centre, with ceramic tile paving, a deep white moulded fascia above the shop fronts, glazed roofing over the malls and hanging coloured panels repeating the name of the centre. The design is consistent without being distinguished, and is bright and cheerful.

Allied with high levels of activity, CCTV, Shopwatch programmes, security staff and police patrols, a feeling of security is provided.

All of the following crime types experienced declines between 1999/00 and 2001/02: shop theft, commercial burglary, theft from a person, criminal damage to buildings, violent crime, drug offences and vehicle crime.

■ **The external spaces and streets are overlooked by residential tower blocks that also provide activity around the clock.**

■ **Prominent display of the Bridges Centre logo reinforces its status as a controlled space that is distinct from the rest of the city centre.**

■ **The shopping centre only has three entrances, although each is connected to the existing street network.**

@t–Bristol,
including Underground Car Park

Overview

The leisure and learning opportunities provided at @t-Bristol have successfully transformed a derelict harbour side location into a vibrant city centre quarter. Centred around a series of landscaped public spaces, the complex includes a wildlife exhibition with tropical rainforest, a hands-on science museum, a planetarium, a cinema and public art, alongside shops, cafes and bars.

@t-Bristol, including its secure underground car park, demonstrates how the use of high quality design and programmed management can make places that are safe and popular. As such, @t-Bristol is a key component of the city's urban renaissance and has lessons for leisure and mixed use developments in all contexts and for urban brownfield developments of all types.

Context

@t-Bristol is set within the Bristol Harbourside Regeneration Area, previously a largely derelict, contaminated former industrial site in multiple ownership. @tBristol was developed over a 5-year period by a public/private partnership with funding from the Millennium Commission, South West Regional Development Agency, the City Council and private companies.

Bristol Harbourside was recognised in the UDP as a key strategic site and subject to a Planning Brief, adopted as Supplementary Planning Guidance. A Council planning advice note on community safety was also drawn upon, as was a site-specific Police Architectural Liaison protocol for 'designing out crime'. The ALO commented upon proposals for the buildings, public space and car park.

Though close to the city centre, and accessible, the site was relatively unused. Pero's Bridge, built in 1999, creates a new link to the station and the rest of the city.

Process

The planning and design solutions followed from the Planning Brief, implemented via an international architectural competition. The quality of the public realm has been paramount. Lively public art ensures a built environment that demands respect, and the range of activities mean that it is lively throughout the day and evening.

There are around 40 CCTV cameras around the site, plus 39 in the 2-story underground car park. A central control room is staffed 24 hours a day. There are also security patrols.

The underground car park has a Secured Car Park Award. The interior is brightly-lit and colour-coded with large, clear signage to improve 'legibility'. The glass entrances allow for excellent natural surveillance when entering and leaving the car park, and let natural light into the underground stairwells.

■ Good design of buildings and public space, including art and planting, creates a sense of place.

Outcome

@t-Bristol's design excellence, generation of activity throughout day, the creative use of public space and the surveillance provided by CCTV and security guards have engendered a feeling of safety throughout.

It has been the catalyst for the wider regeneration of the Harbourside Area, with proposals for an adjoining mixed use development in the pipeline.

The success of @t-Bristol has been recognised with a series of awards, including a Civic Trust Award in recognition of the significant contribution to the development of the city, an RIBA Award for

Architecture and numerous tourism awards, including Family Attraction of the Year.

Crime figures confirm the success. The first two years of operation saw only two offences in the car park – one case of criminal damage to the building and one theft from a motor vehicle. Crime throughout @t-Bristol remains low-less than in the surrounding area across the full range of offences.

■ 'Legibility' is helped by the excellent signage.

■ Features such as clear signage, good lighting, CCTV and colour-coded levels contributed to the achievement of a Secured Car Park award.

■ A landmark footbridge connects the new public space to the rest of the city.

Heywood Distribution Park

Overview

Heywood Distribution Park is an assembly of storage buildings enclosed within a secure perimeter. The newly developed part of the area has a consistently good design quality, both in terms of buildings and the roads, parking and landscaping.

The security features are in two categories: those provided and operated by the developer and those by the individual tenants. Together, they create a secure environment in a vulnerable locality. Having a secure environment is important as a sales tool for the developer, which insists on Secured By Design certificates.

Context

The site's main vehicle approach is from the M66, about 1 km to the west. The area has a road and open land on three sides, with no overlooking, and an underused railway line on the north side, with a local authority housing estate beyond. The site has been extended and upgraded over the last 8 years, from a run down industrial estate (part of which still exists at the north-west corner) to a modern distribution park.

The road-based nature of the activities and the security measures do not produce a strong relationship to the surroundings physically or socially. However, the developers have avoided the appearance of a fortified enclave.

Process

A Masterplan has guided the siting of buildings, roads and landscaping, following the recommendations contained in Greater Manchester Police's Designing Out Crime – Industrial Buildings. Features include:

- Laminated glass in openings

- Lockable opening lights

- One entry point only

- Retractable bollards at ground floor openings

- Exits openable only from inside

- Anti-jemmy devices around openings.

Recommendations are geared according to risk on a site-by-site basis. CCTV, burglar alarms, electronic locks and suchlike are left for tenants to provide so that they can standardise contracts and secure information about the functioning of the equipment.

The design solutions are supplemented by a range of day to day management initiatives, including dog patrols, CCTV monitoring, control of entry and exits movements at the main gate, and maintenance of fencing lighting, roads and landscaping.

■ The park's owners have sought to instil a sense of ownership into occupants by creating a strong image.

Outcome

Heywood Distribution Park has won a reputation as a secure place to locate business, confirmed by the presence of major retailers and electrical goods suppliers. Design is in the hands of one architect leading to a consistency in the appearance of buildings and use of materials.

The security arrangements are discreet but effective, with the aim of avoiding a fortress appearance. The perimeter fence along the road, for example, is close mesh, flexible but difficult to climb, and resistant to ramming. Planting softens the appearance but this also is designed with security in mind. There is one main gateway, a feature building with offices bridging the entry/exit lanes with kerb risers to prevent unauthorised exit.

Police data includes only 10 incidents of any crime in 2001/02, compared with 53 in a nearby industrial estate of similar size but without the same level of security.

■ The single entry point to the park sends out a message about the security throughout.

■ Security measures are combined with landscaping that create a pleasing and safe working environment.

West Road Health Centre, Newcastle-upon-Tyne

Key Success Factors

- ■ An emphasis on 'target hardening' measures
- ■ Internal design to reduce crime
- ■ Good lighting, both natural and artificial
- ■ CCTV

Key Facts

Date of development:
1996–7

Lead designer:
Purves and Partners Architects

Developer:
West Road Health Centre

Police Force:
Northumbria Police

Area of analysis:
0.05 hectares

Contact details:
Sue Shone, Practice Manager, West Road Health Centre, 0191 273 6364

Overview

The health centre was originally housed in a corner house at the end of a terrace of shops. This became inadequate, so in 1996 it was enlarged with an extension at the rear. Being situated in a deprived area, crime, and especially burglary, was a problem. The new premises are more secure and this problem has declined, although there is still violence from patients on the doctors and staff, and street crime persists outside. The surgery is now well-lit and pleasant, with possibilities for observation balanced with requirements for privacy.

Context

The original surgery was extended to respond to the needs of the growing practice. To the north is an area of pre-war semi detached houses. On the south side of West Road are older terraced house with a high unemployment rate.

Hoyle Avenue is closed to vehicles at the West Road end. A service road at the rear of the health centre provides access to the rear of the shops. Parking is available on the road, but three gated spaces on the plot cannot be used because of cars parked on the road obstructing the access.

Prior to the remodelling the surgery suffered from regular break-ins and criminal damage.

Process

When it was decided to proceed with an extension, an improvement grant was obtained and an endowment mortgage raised by the partners. The architects appointed, Purves and Partners, appreciated the need for security, but did not wish to create a fortress. The accommodation is bright and well lit. Views from one space to another are good. The architects intended to have an open reception desk but the partners insisted on some protection and this is provided by a glazed screen. Space and light were seen as conducive to creating a calm environment and the design is successful in this respect.

■ Bay plan form provides surveillance up and down the street.

Health

Outcome

On the ground floor is the reception and office, a waiting room, three consulting rooms and a treatment room. On the first floor is another waiting room, two consulting rooms and offices. A flat roof with roof lights is concealed from the outside. The building is equipped with CCTV in the reception and waiting rooms. There are alarm buttons in each of the consulting rooms and burglar alarms connected directly to the police.

On the side and back road frontages are substantial 2 metre-high steel railings. Some of the ground floor windows have burglar bars. The design generally is a bold response to meeting the demand for medical facilities in a deprived area subject to above average levels of crime. There have been no burglaries from the health centre since redevelopment.

■ Enclosed space is visible from the street.

■ The alley to the rear of the health centre makes it particularly vulnerable to crime, leading to a more defensive built form.

■ Railings clearly define private space and impede unauthorised entry.

Parrs Wood Technology College
Greater Manchester

Overview

This recently-rebuilt secondary school is unusual in having the grounds unfenced and accessible to the public. It is on the site of a prefabricated school that had many security and disorder problems. A new leisure centre, built on the site as part of the funding arrangements, adjoins the school.

The aim was to create a school that students would be proud of and would be safe without having overly visible security measures. This aim has been successful, thanks to a secure building envelope with a single controlled entrance and a comprehensive CCTV system monitored by security guards on 24-hour duty. There is co-operation with the security arrangements at the leisure centre. The local police are enthusiastic about the results.

Context

The school sits within a parkland setting, which was the inspiration to design a new school appropriate to the campus type environment.

The school replaces a rambling prefabricated building which had numerous corridors, external doors and insecure roof lights. It was subject to break-ins, vandalism and bullying. The large site, however, allowed a portion fronting the roads to be leased for building what is now a major leisure centre accommodating cinema, bingo, bowling, a health club and restaurants. The car parks have a multi use function, responding to demand occurring at different times. There is also a hotel on its own site on the northern edge.

The site is fully accessible, including the school playing fields. However, the footpaths do not function as short cuts and the river provides a barrier on the east side.

Process

Following the securing of funding as the result of leasing part of the site, a design was prepared which created a modern building with a clear identity in a campus setting. The architects worked in consultation with the school head teacher and the Manchester Police ALO.

It was decided to avoid a school with obvious defensive measures, such as gates, fences and warning notices. Instead, the site was allowed to be accessible to the public and the protection provided at the building envelope. Ground floor openings were minimised and one main entry provided. This has a security guard on 24 hour duty and a monitoring point for the CCTV cameras covering the inside and outside of the school. Secured by Design certificates were awarded.

■ The site is freely open to public access under integrated security surveillance.

Outcome

The school has a clear and distinctive identity, which aims to instil a sense of pride in the students. There are benefits from the joint development of the site, such as combined use of parking space, co-operation between security staff, and shared access. Only a few incidents have been reported recently and two of these relate to the on-site building works.

The new school was designed to avoid places of concealment and the comprehensive CCTV coverage provides further security. The most noticeable feature of the design is the openness of the site. This has not brought crime problems and demonstrates that schools do not inevitably need to be separated from their surroundings.

The approach is to some extent dependent on 24 hour security presence and CCTV monitoring.

Between 1999/00 and 2001/02, there was a 53% fall in recorded crime.

■ Whilst the site has no restricted access, the buildings themselves are built to very high security specifications.

■ The open site layout allows for surveillance throughout, by users and CCTV.

Mowbray Park
Sunderland

Overview

Mowbray Park is a city centre Victorian municipal park that has been sensitively restored and made safer. Visibility has been improved, wardens are employed to patrol the park and CCTV cameras have been installed. The nature of crime has changed from serious incidents to juvenile disorder. New Winter Gardens and removal of perimeter hedges has improved natural surveillance from outside the park.

Context

Mowbray Park, which dates from the mid-1800s, is on the English Heritage register of Historic Parks and Gardens. There are numerous artefacts in the park including the War Memorial, a prominent column on the west side, a Victorian bandstand and various statues and memorials, one of which is protected by a toughened glass enclosure.

The site is bounded by roads on three sides and Sunderland Museum and the new Winter Gardens on the fourth.

The park provides a diagonal route to housing on the east side and is used extensively for this purpose. A children's playground and Ranger's office is on this side. On the west side is a footbridge crossing the road to the Civic Centre. The Civic Centre provides some overlooking of the southern part of the park and there is some surveillance from the east and north.

Process

The park has been remodelled as part of a £3.3m programme involving upgrading of the Museum and construction of the Winter Garden, along with the restoration of the Park. The police were consulted.

- The work involved:

- Removal of some trees and of perimeter hedges

- Removal of undergrowth from a railway cutting within the park

- New 1-2 metre railings around the boundaries (police advised that higher railings would not significantly improve security)

- A new children's play area, raised to allow surveillance

- Improvement in visibility across the park by restoring lost views and reducing enclosure.

A management and maintenance regime was also introduced with wardens, CCTV and mobile contract security teams at night. The park closes at dusk, and is unlit. Ball games, cycling and alcohol are banned.

■ Selective tree felling has created unobstructed views and few opportunities for concealment.

Outcome

The result is a high quality urban park enhancing Sunderland City Centre and providing a place for relaxation, enjoyment, play space for children and an attractive pedestrian route to the city centre. Security measures such as CCTV and the Park Rangers office are very visible and the perimeter fencing is a deterrent to casual entry without being forbidding.

The re-design is a successful approach to urban park restoration in a city centre location. It has deterred crime without emphasis on obtrusive exclusion devices.

There are an average of 10 incidents of crime or anti-social behaviour per month, down from 30-50 before the current measures were fully implemented.

■ The children's play area is open to view from within and outside the park.

■ Conspicuous CCTV surveillance is provided by high mounted cameras.

■ The presence of a park ranger has reduced anti–social behaviour by ensuring that the park's rules are adhered to.

Clarence Mews
Hackney

Key Success Factors
■ The re–use of derelict buildings in a crime hotspot
■ An emphasis on overlooking from buildings that are used throughout the day
■ The closing off of access to rear gardens
■ Improvements in environmental quality

Key Facts	
Date of Development	2000–2002
Lead Designer	Cazenove Architects
Developer	Clarence Mews Development Group
Local Authority	London Borough of Hackney
Police Force	Metropolitan Police
Area of Analysis	0.1 hectares
Contact Details	Louise Goodison, Cazenove Architects, 020 8525 5520

Overview

This private initiative at the centre of an inner-city mews, previously known for anti-social behaviour including drug dealing, has, together with other developments, provided an effective lift to the quality and security of the area.

Newly-built ground floor business uses and the upper floor residential space not only provide surveillance to the mews, but also reinstate the security for the bordering houses that was traditionally provided by stable blocks on the site. The replacement and deterioration of these over the years had resulted in a predominance of low-grade commercial uses, with many derelict premises. This trend is now being reversed thanks to imaginative design, carried out in consultation with the local police, and a Planning Consent that recognised the value of a mixed use development in this location.

Context

Clarence Mews was the traditional mews associated with the substantial 19th century houses fronting onto Clapton Square. Some of the gardens between the back of the houses and the mews have partly been lost to development, but have survived at the rear of the four houses backing on to the development site. Apart from the newer developments, the environmental quality is poor and the mews was a place for drug dealing, car crime and break-ins.

There was a unique combination of participants in this initiative. The owner of one of the houses on Clapton Square, an architect, was interested in using the mews premises as offices, the neighbours either side also wished to realise the potential of the mews frontage and protect the rear of their properties.

Process

The design approach provides combined business and residential units to improve the environment of the mews and facilitate surveillance to protect the rear gardens, and to act as a catalyst for future improvement.

The ALO was consulted at the design stage and advised on the nature of the crime in the area, security measures, and how development could help. The planning authority recognised that a change was necessary to the type of uses that had previously been permitted. The properties on Clapton Square are listed and are part of a conservation area, the boundary of which is within the gardens of the houses and does not include the mews. Funding was solely from private sources.

■ Cross section showing the relationship of the new building to surrounding development and summarising anti-crime design features.

Outcome

The result is a modern design with vibrant colours enlivening the drab surroundings and providing an active frontage at the centre of the mews with overlooking from the roof terraces and from the living rooms on the first floor. Part of the ground floor is glazed. Steel shutters are provided internally avoiding a blank street frontage when they are closed. The ground floor is set back 1 metre from the street, with the first floor overhang extending to the street edge. This overhang deters climbers.

The improvement to Clarence Mews has left it unattractive for the anti-social activities that previously occurred, raised values and provided encouragement for other property owners to make similar changes. The project was featured in the 2002 Housing Design Awards.

Allegations of disorder fell by 19% between 1999/00 and 2001/02.

■ The development raises the attractiveness of the mews, encouraging further rehabilitation.

■ Attention to detail means that visitors can be identified before the door is opened.

■ The new building creates a frontage onto the mews, providing seclusion and security for previously vulnerable private gardens.

Birkenhead Bus Station

Key Facts

Date of Development
1996

Lead Designer
Cass and Associates

Developer
Merseytravel

Local Authority
Wirral Borough Council

Police Force
Merseyside

Area of Analysis
0.5 hectares

Contact
Terry Heaton, Merseytravel,
0151 330 1552 (design issues)
Linda Walsh, Merseytravel,
0151 330 1551 (operational issues)

Overview

This town centre bus station is enclosed predominantly by glass, appearing at first sight to be very vulnerable to crime and vandalism. This is not the case and while some of the control can be attributed to the surveillance devices, security staff, and management of the bus station, the design must take a good deal of the credit.

The 'loop' design and transparent walls contribute to excellent visibility into, out of and through the structure. The levels of lighting both by day and night deter criminal activities. Transport interchanges have been identified as the location for 30% of muggings. This structure indicates how design can contribute to solving the problem.

Context

Birkenhead bus station replaces a number of on street stops. Pedestrian access to the town centre facilities is excellent and Conway Park Railway Station is about 300m to the north. The bus station is not a terminus but serves through routes by means of a loop road. Bus routes radiate in all directions – there are more than 50 services with approximately 20 buses per hour per stand. The site provided for the bus station is smaller than first intended. Competing needs for car parking required that the bus station be designed within the narrow part of the triangular site.

The town centre location, with adjacent night time entertainment and parking, and the fact that a right of way passes through, mean a potentially high risk of crime and disorder.

Process

The bus station was completed in 1996 following a package bid and receipt of Objective One funding. As part of the design process, consultation took place under the Community Links Partnership involving representatives of disabled groups, schools, women's groups, the police, bus operators and the wider community.

The location required the provision of the following security features:

- CCTV, monitored in the facilities office
- Audio warnings
- High intensity lighting
- Maximum visibility
- Lockable waiting areas
- Alarm buttons in sales areas

In addition, security at the bus station is provided by a range of management measures, including:

- Security staff
- Security link to retailers
- Use of Exclusion Orders
- Contract cleaners trained to deal with drug users' needles

■ **High standards of design give the impression of a place where crime and anti–social behaviour is not tolerated.**

Outcome

Birkenhead Bus Station has a distinctive design, achieved by the continuous curved form and the glazed enclosure, that successfully reduces the effect of the restricted site and the close proximity of the flank wall of a shopping centre. The design encompasses crime reduction features allowing surveillance from one stand to another, from buses into the waiting areas and from passers-by. These are assisted by good quality lighting, CCTV and the management measures mentioned above. Vandalism and graffiti have not occurred, as was feared when the large areas of glazing appeared. There has been only one case of breakage, believed to be accidental.

■ **A facilities office within the bus station provides 24 hour security.**

■ **Transparency assists surveillance both inside and outside the bus station.**

There are an average of 5.7 incidents of crime and anti-social behaviour per 100,000 users, compared with 20 for Bootle bus station and 16.4 at Huyton – two comparable Merseyside locations.

■ **A well-lit and uncluttered interior produces clear lines of sight between users.**

Annex 2
Reconciling evidence of what works, knowledge of crime reduction and community safety principles, and values

Introduction

This Annex provides a general overview of crime theory and research evidence base, and urban design issues that underpins this Good Practice Guide. It is not a detailed review. However, it does seek to encourage and guide the longer-term evolution of practice, theory, research and evaluation in this important area. This Annex also introduces some of the wider and more challenging issues which emerge in efforts to bring the planning system and crime reduction significantly closer together. Further reading to support the existing evidence base may be found in Annex 3.

Evidence-based policy and practice — good in principle but how firm a platform in reality?

In all spheres of government there has been a strong move towards evidence-based policies and practices, to improve cost-effectiveness and sustainability. Crime reduction is no exception (see for example Goldblatt and Lewis 1998 and in particular Chapter 3 on the evidence for situational crime prevention, Ekblom 1998; also Clarke 1997). There is an increasing amount of good quality research on burglary reduction and car crime (volume crime problems which would be likely to be affected by planning decisions). However, much concerns security fittings and construction and the management of vehicles or buildings, and does not relate to land use and layout. To date there is limited detailed research on crime reduction in and around the built environment.

Such research as does exist does not always support the traditional schools of design or planning against crime like Defensible Space Theory advocated by Oscar Newman (Newman 1972). Indeed, the authority of most of the pioneers has been questioned (Ekblom 1995). For example, the research methods and analysis on which

Newman's ideas were based were fiercely criticised (Bottoms 1974; Mayhew 1979). Alice Coleman's (enclosure-centred) ideas on design disadvantagement, its effects on crime and how to remedy it, were strongly attacked (see for example Lipman and Harris 1988; Poyner and Webb 1992), and pretty much demolished by a large-scale DOE-funded evaluation (DOE 1997). Bill Hillier (see Hillier and Shu 2000) provocatively entitled one of his earlier articles Against Enclosure.

This confusion is not new. For a number of years, there remained two distinct schools of thoughts, each within their own independent domain of theory, method and findings. One school viewed neighbourhood crime and disorder as mainly caused by social processes (such as child density, housing allocation policies which served to concentrate offenders in residence, estate management and formation of area reputations); the other school they excoriated as 'architectural determinists'. With one exception, there was no attempt to mount a study, which would simultaneously embrace both social and design factors. That exception was Home Office research on Defensible Space features of blocks of flats (Wilson 1978), which indicated that while varying levels of Defensible Space did affect the risk of vandalism, child density was a much more powerful determinant and in effect swamped the other factors.

One topic of particular interest to key professional disciplines concerns enclosure and permeability. While the more reliable research findings are still somewhat conflicting or confusing, some significant clarification is beginning to emerge.

The 1998 British Crime Survey (Budd 1999, Table A.3.6 p51) shows cul-de-sacs to be least at risk from successful burglaries (the figures are 4.3% of households on main roads victimised per year,

3.5% side roads and just 2.1% in cul-de-sacs, although this doesn't filter out confounding effects for example of household income or type of area). For attempted burglaries, cul-de-sac risks are the same as main roads and better than side roads.

Armitage's (very recently-completed but as yet provisional) in-depth re-investigation of Secured By Design and environmental risk factors in West Yorkshire also suggests that cul-de-sacs are at lower risk of victimisation, unless they are 'leaky', i.e. with a footpath exit. Footpaths leading to shops, or to a maze of other footpaths, are particularly strong risk factors. But there is another complication: once targeted by offenders, cul-de-sacs have a higher risk of repeat victimisation. The interpretation is that distance from through routes is more likely to protect from burglary because such homes are less likely to be scanned in passing by burglary target seekers. However, once the first offence has safely been committed, these same factors cease to apply and distance from scrutiny becomes an advantage. Poyner's work on Northampton (Poyner and Webb 1991) indicates more cash and jewellery taken from through roads, electrical goods from cul-de-sacs with footpaths — likely due to burglars adjusting their activities according to tactical constraints and opportunities.

The major divergence remains with the 'space syntax' analyses of Hillier and his colleagues. Hillier and Shu (2000) for example found that the total number of burglaries was least on through roads with houses lining both sides of the street, greatest with footpaths, particularly rear dead-end ones giving access to back gardens, and intermediate for cul-de-sacs.

There is still some major work to be done to reconcile all these findings, some of it focusing very carefully on methodology of measurement and analysis, including taking account of the physical and socio-demographic context of housing. These knowledge gaps in both risk factors and what works can be reduced in two ways: by large-scale research studies and by persistent and systematic efforts to conduct many individual evaluations of interventions located in diverse environments, with a deliberate effort to synthesise the results. For the collective good, planners and local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships should be prepared to feed this knowledge pool by supporting innovation and evaluation.

What are the limits to knowledge?

It will never be possible to completely fill existing knowledge gaps in crime reduction. There are fundamental limits to the coverage of 'what works' knowledge, whether the knowledge is based on reliable, systematically-assembled evidence, practitioners' experience or both.

Studies of (usually unsuccessful) attempts to replicate crime reduction success stories suggest that what works is highly context-sensitive (Tilley 1993). They also indicate that simplistic, 'cookbook' solutions are not guaranteed to work. Instead, practitioners need to follow an intelligent process of obtaining information on crime problems and risks and selecting and customising interventions according to problem and context (Ekblom 2002a). The kind of knowledge that is needed is a combination of generic principles that apply across a range of circumstances, plus practical details to realise them in particular locales. For example, the strategy of alley-gating applies the principle of creating a target enclosure in place of an open back alley; the specific method is the alley-gate itself; the detailed knowledge includes the need for the gate to fit top and bottom; and the very detailed knowledge includes the requirement to galvanise the base against corrosion. Location-specific knowledge may relate for example to the type of wall anchorage appropriate for the building material, the styling to match the architecture and the presence of elderly or disabled users who may need special kinds of lock.

Some causal principles produce conflicting predictions. For example, greater permeability, if it successfully leads to more people out and about, might be thought to foster Jane Jacobs' (1961) 'eyes on the street' surveillance processes. To what extent, and under what conditions, might the benefits of such passing surveillance outweigh the alternative security benefits of enclosure and wider defensible space such as 'ease of detecting strangers' and 'collective motivation and authority to challenge them'?

It is unlikely that the causes of crime and disorder events in urban environments simply add to one another, steadily increasing the risk in a linear fashion. The traditional type of additive 'factor-based' knowledge (such as 'end of terrace sites are always riskier') can go only so far in predicting risk — on average, such locations will indeed be riskier. But it is configurations of a range of factors — environmental conditions such as lines of surveillance and escape, presence of criminally-inclined and motivated offenders, crime targets, and potential defenders of person and property — which determine quite subtly whether an area will remain tranquil or become a hot-spot for crime or disorder. Likewise, the kinds of solution that work best will be a particular combination of principles and practical methods that fits the configuration and perhaps adds a synergy of its own.

It is important to develop this capacity to home in on the risk in a particular place (and/or time of day, day of week, season). Otherwise there is a risk of imposing 'one size fits all' security solutions, with the likelihood of getting it wrong, or more likely of over- or under-engineering the solution relative to the crime problem and the range of other values and priorities that planners must consider. (In this context it is interesting that Secured By Design has

increasingly moved towards a flexible, adaptive stance rather than one of rigid prescription.)

The final point to make here is that crime problems and their contexts change, along with land use more generally. Businesses may appear in a previously residential area, perhaps as a result of development policy; traffic routes may alter; housing allocation policy may concentrate or disperse potential offenders; offenders themselves may adapt to existing methods of prevention, rendering them locally or nationally obsolete; new technology may create new tools and targets for crime; and social change may affect occupancy. Generic principles endure, but the specific, detailed knowledge of what works in crime reduction is a wasting asset, like a rusting car that needs constant renewal.

Bearing in mind these limits to knowledge, how can what we do know be translated to support its application to on-the-ground activity?

There is a range of possible strategies to cope with these limitations, some of which are within the planning system, some in its interface with other processes and some entirely outside.

- Defining the fundamental values more clearly will enable a better understanding of how they interface. This has been attempted, in this guide, for community safety and access/movement. Explicit definitions will also clarify how the values are served, and under what conditions, by particular principles such as enclosure or permeability. This is not always straightforward because the relationships between the principles and the values are sometimes inconsistent – enclosure of the wrong kind can hide a burglar from view, and too much permeability can expose residents to stress.

- It is important to develop valid ways of measuring the values operationally, to better relate the principles to the values. Crime can be measured relatively well, but consequences of crime not so clearly. For example, is it possible to measure accessibility and movement, or even permeability? The space syntax team (and their intellectual offshoot Intelligent Space), have developed some methods, but are they enough? Does permeability get people out of cars and onto feet, bikes, and into shops, cinemas etc (Town 2002)? What other conditions might mediate the link between physical permeability and achieved access and movement?

- Operationalising and measuring the values and the principles helps to deal with the competing priorities between them. It is not always possible to resolve such tradeoffs at the level of generalities (for example, by saying that on average, enclosure gives better security than accessibility). Sometimes it is possible to make the choice at the level of immediate, tangible features (e.g. rear alleys are rarely a good thing). But mostly, the fine detail of the particular location will swing the balance in favour of enclosure in one place, but accessibility in other subtly different ones. And the relative priorities may vary too – here, security may predominate; there, accessibility.

- In resolving competing priorities there is an important role for creativity. Rather than struggling to make unhappy compromises between security and accessibility (where these are in conflict) it should often be possible to make creative leaps which relax the tradeoff and enable both values to be realised simultaneously. Technology and design can help. An example from security versus fire safety is the traditional US fire escape. The tradeoff is between letting occupants escape a blaze whilst preventing burglars from getting in. The solution is the swing-down or slide-down final run of steps, which is activated by the weight of the fleeing residents.

- Interventions often work best in synergistic combinations – for example, in broad terms, a carefully-specified mixture of situational and offender-oriented action, only some of which will come under the planning remit. This means, ideally, that planning decisions are taken in awareness of, and perhaps in coordination with, other crime reduction policies and practices. There will be strict statutory limits to this, of course. So those locally responsible for crime and disorder strategy (i.e. Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, particularly working with S17 of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 in mind, which requires local authorities to consider crime and disorder reduction while exercising all their duties) should also be taking the wider overview of a whole series of potential crime control systems – planning, design, construction, management, operation – security behaviour and supporting technology, reaction to breaches, and care and maintenance. Planning sets the scene for many of those that follow. Good planning will reduce the load on crime reduction through site management and maintenance, for example; poor planning will leave a legacy of crime risks and costs.

- Planning is largely a one-off decision anticipating particular costs and benefits of a particular land use proposal. As said, crime causes and crime problems change (but so do other land use factors). Techniques such as crime impact analysis (e.g. Ekblom 2002b) can be developed to help forecast crime problems correctly in the first place, but allowing for upgradeability is an important consideration to future-proof against crime. For example, the possibility of closing off some paths in the event of an emergent crime problem should be incorporated in the approved design. Inevitably, though, crime problems that the planning process was unable to resolve

because they weren't susceptible to planning control have to be handled through downstream activities such as site management and maintenance or police patrolling. Since these of course are running-cost solutions and likely to be more expensive, they should be kept to a minimum.

- Techniques for envisaging environmental configurations, which are likely to be criminogenic or crime-resistant, exist at several levels. One possibility is the use of virtual reality techniques to envisage proposed new or modified environments – for example to identify and design out shadowy lurking spaces or climbing possibilities. This is currently prohibitively expensive and time-consuming with many applications, mainly due to laborious data capturing requirements (although laser-scanning and ever-more powerful computers may eventually help), with one exception. Computer-Aided Design of new developments often comes with the capacity for virtual reality display – here, it is even possible to see what a CCTV camera view might look like from particular points.

- At a more conceptual level, one contribution to configurational thinking comes from the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity framework (www.crimereduction.gov.uk/ learningzone/cco.htm). CCO seeks to help practitioners to identify and think in a systematic, problem-solving way by focusing on 11 immediate causes of crime, i.e. those close to the criminal event, and 11 equally generic kinds of intervention in those causes. Concepts and terms are clearly defined, giving benefits in precision of communication, sharing knowledge and action. By incorporating the widest range of factors, it can help planners and their colleagues in policing and community safety to develop a picture of the whole configuration of causes converging in a locality. This not only covers 'thinking criminal' (as per Clarke's 'rational offender' approach, *Clarke 1997*) but also thinking from the perspective of crime preventers and/or victims. Practitioners familiar with CCO are thereby well-placed to forecast crime risks 'incoming' from extraneous sources; and assess the potential crime impact of planning proposals (or indeed of any local authority action under S17 of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998).

- So broadly speaking the kind of expertise to be developed to get the best out of environmentally-based crime reduction as a whole is less one of the technician applying a limited set of diagnostic tools and more one of the consultant with all principles at his or her fingertips, ready to configure and adjust on the fly, in specific circumstances.

Urban design guidance

The Government publication, By Design, states that urban design concerns the connections between people and places, movement and urban form, nature and the built fabric, and the processes for ensuring successful villages, towns and cities. By Design summarises the objectives of urban design as:

- Character: a place with its own identity

- Continuity and enclosure: a place where public and private spaces are clearly distinguished

- Quality of the public realm: a place with attractive and successful outdoor areas

- Ease of movement: a place that is easy to get to and move through

- Legibility: a place that has a clear image and is easy to understand

- Adaptability: a place that can change easily

- Diversity: a place with variety and choice

There is a selection of other design guidance that has been published by the Government, including Better Places to Live: a companion guide to PPG3 (on housing development) and Places, Streets and Movement: a companion guide to Design Bulletin 32 (on residential roads and footpaths).

Annex 3
Evidence base: further reading

General crime reduction

- Clarke R. 1997, *Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies 2nd Edn*. Albany, N.Y.: Harrow and Heston

- Curtin, L., Tilley, N., Owen, M. & Pease, K. 2001, *Developing Crime Reduction Plans: some examples from the Reducing Burglary Initiative*, Home Office Crime Reduction Research Series Paper

- Department of the Environment 1997, *An evaluation of DICE Schemes*. Regeneration Research Summary No. 11 1997. London: DOE (now ODPM)

- Ekblom, P. 1995, 'Less crime, by design'. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 539: 114-129 (Special review edition edited by Prof. Wesley Skogan, Northwestern University)

- Ekblom, P. 1998, 'Situational crime prevention' in Goldblatt, P. and Lewis, C. (eds.) 1998, Reducing Offending: An Assessment of Research Evidence on Ways of Dealing with Offending Behaviour. Home Office Research Study No. 187. London Home Office.

- Ekblom, P. 2001, *The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity: a framework for crime reduction*, Home Office (see www. crimereduction.gov.uk /learningzone/cco.htm)

- Ekblom, P. 2002a, 'From the Source to the Mainstream is Uphill: The Challenge of Transferring Knowledge of Crime Prevention Through Replication, Innovation and Anticipation.' In: N. Tilley (ed.) Analysis for Crime Prevention, Crime Prevention Studies 13: 131-203. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Justice Press/ Devon, UK: Willan Publishing

- Ekblom, P. 2002b, 'Future Imperfect: Preparing for the Crimes to Come.' *Criminal Justice Matters* 46 Winter 2001/02:38-40. London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Kings College

- Goldblatt, P. and Lewis, C. (eds.) 1998, *Reducing Offending: an Assessment of Research Evidence on Ways of Dealing with Offending Behaviour*. Home Office Research Study 187. London: Home Office

- Jacobs, J. 1961, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Random House

- Lipman, A, and Harris, H. 1988, 'Alice Coleman's Dystopia—Refusals from Nowhere', in *Rehumanising Housing*, eds. N. Teymour, T.A. Markus and T.A. Wooley, London: Butterworths

- Read T. & Tilley N. 2000, *Not rocket science? Problem solving and crime reduction*, Home Office Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 6

- Schneider, R. & Kitchen, T. 2002, *Planning for crime prevention: a Transatlantic perspective*, London: Routledge

- Tilley, N. 1993, *After Kirkholt: Theory, Methods and Results of Replication Evaluations*. Crime Prevention Unit Paper 47. London: Home Office

- Tilley, N. & Laycock, G. 2002, *Working out what to do: evidence-based crime reduction*, Home Office Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 11

- Tilley, N., Pease, K., Hough, M. & Brown, R. 1999, *Burglary prevention: early lessons from the Crime Reduction Programme*, Home Office Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 1

Access and movement

The movement framework

- Armitage, R. 2000, *An evaluation of Secured by Design housing in West Yorkshire*, Home Office Briefing Note 7/00

- Armitage, R. forthcoming, *Secured by design refined: environmental risk factors, offenders' modus operandi and costs and incentives*

- Hillier, B. & Shu, S. 1999, 'Do burglars understand defensible space?: New evidence on the relation between crime and space', Planning in London, April 1999

- Knowles, P. 2001, *Defensible space and the distribution of crime and disorder in residential areas*, Bedfordshire Police

- Newman, O. 1972, *Defensible space: crime prevention through urban design*, New York: Macmillan

- Pascoe, T. 1999, *Evaluation of Secured by Design in public sector housing*, Watford: Building Research Establishment

- Poyner, B. & Webb, B. 1991, *Crime free housing*, Oxford: Butterworth Architecture (updated version in preparation)

- Property Crime Reduction Action Team. 2001, *Tackling property crime: an initial report from the Property Crime Reduction Action Team*

- Shu, S. 2000, 'Housing layout and crime vulnerability', Urban Design International, 5, 177-188

- Tilley, N., Pease, K., Hough, M. & Brown, R. 1999, *Burglary prevention: early lessons from the Crime Reduction Programme*, Home Office Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 1

- Town S. 2002, *Permeability, Access Opportunities and Crime*. Unpublished paper, West Yorkshire Police

Access to dwellings

- Armitage, R. 2000, *An evaluation of Secured by Design housing in West Yorkshire*, Home Office Briefing Note 7/00

- Armitage, R. forthcoming, *Secured by design refined: environmental risk factors, offenders' modus operandi and costs and incentives*

- Budd, T. 1999, *Burglary of domestic dwellings: findings from the British Crime Survey*, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 4/99

- Johnson, S. & Loxley, C. 2001, *Installing alley-gates: practical lessons from burglary prevention projects*, Home Office Briefing Note 2/01

- Pascoe, T. 1999, *Evaluation of Secured by Design in public sector housing*, Watford: Building Research Establishment

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Structure

Building and layout type

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- Cozens, P. M., Hillier, D. and Prescott, G. 2002, 'Criminogenic Associations and British Housing Design'. International Journal of Planning, 7

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- Hillier, B. and Shu S. 2000, 'Crime and urban layout: the need for evidence'. In: S. Ballintyne, K. Pease and V. McLaren (eds.), Secure Foundations: Key Issues in Crime Prevention, Crime Reduction and Community Safety. London: Institute for Public Policy Research

- Hillier, B. 2002, 'Can streets be made safe?', London: Space Syntax

- Shaftoe, H. 2001, *Crime prevention and security in Great Britain*, Bristol: University of the West of England

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- Tilley, N., Pease, K., Hough, M. & Brown, R. 1999, *Burglary prevention: early lessons from the Crime Reduction Programme*, Home Office Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 1

- Wilson, S. 1978, 'Vandalism and Defensible Space on London Housing Estates', in *Tackling Vandalism*, ed. R.V. Clarke, Home Office Research Study 47: 41-65, London: HMSO

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Further information

The following organisations are useful sources of additional information:

ACPO Crime Prevention Initiatives: www.acpo.police.uk/about/cpi.html

CABE www.cabe.org.uk

Crime Concern www.crimeconcern.org.uk

The Design Council's Design Against Crime initiative www.designagainstcrime.org

Home Office crime reduction website: www.crimereduction.gov.uk

NACRO www.nacro.org.uk

Planning Officers Society: www.planningofficers.org.uk

Annex 4
Summary of checklists

Access and movement

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1 Have the consequences of the number and nature of all connections been considered?
2 Do all routes lead to somewhere people want to go? Are all routes necessary?
3 Do routes provide potential offenders with ready and unnoticed access to potential targets?
4 Are routes for different users segregated when they could be integrated?
5 Will pedestrians, cyclists and drivers be able to understand which routes they should use?
6 Is it easy to understand how to travel through an area?

Structure

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1 Have the types of building been selected and designed with security in mind?
2 Is the layout of the development appropriate for the identified crime risk, as well as to meet wider planning objectives?
3 Will all uses in an area be compatible and have potential conflicts been thoroughly thought through?
4 Does all public space serve a purpose and support an appropriate level of legitimate activity?

5 Has the remodelling, removal or re-use of buildings and spaces that are vulnerable to crime been considered?
6 Have the potential benefits for crime prevention of restoring historic environments been considered?

Surveillance

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1 Are opportunities for surveillance from the subject and adjacent buildings maximised?
2 Will those most likely to observe any criminal or anti-social behaviour respond appropriately?
3 Are both of the above true at all times of the day, week and year?
4 Have efforts been made to eliminate 'inactive' frontages and corners?
5 Where appropriate, such as in public buildings, does the design allow for high visibility into the building or site?
6 Are parked cars highly visible but secure?
7 Has lighting been a primary consideration in planning out crime?
8 Is the standard of lighting and its maintenance regime adequate and is it resistant to vandalism and damage? Is it well-designed and well-sited?
9 Is CCTV the best way to solve the particular problem and is it the most effective use of resources?
10 Is the CCTV part of a wider package of crime prevention measures?
11 Will the resources be in place to maintain the CCTV system, including staff to monitor and respond to the pictures, in future years?

Ownership

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1 Will it be clear to users — including potential offenders and capable guardians — which space is public, communal, semi-private and private?
2 Are the boundaries between public, communal and private space signified in the most appropriate manner, be it a physical barrier or a psychological barriers such as changes in paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping and signage?
3 Will the place have an identity of its own?
4 Are all those who should feel ownership involved in defining the place's identity?
5 Are barriers of a high quality of design in their detailing and appropriate to their local context?

Physical protection

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1 Have the 'target hardening' principles of Secured by Design been addressed?
2 Has the potentially negative visual impact of crime prevention measures been addressed and, where these cannot be ameliorated by good design, have the advantages been weighed against their adverse impacts?

Activity

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1 Will as many law abiding people as possible be attracted to use the public realm?
2 Is there a strategy for encouraging residential population in town centres?
3 Should the evening economy be nurtured, and, if so, is it diverse and inclusive?
4 Are mixed uses successfully integrated with one another?
5 Are all uses in an area compatible and have potential conflicts been thoroughly addressed?
6 Will what attracts people to the public realm uphold its attractiveness?

Management and maintenance

In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be borne in mind:

1 Has care been taken to create a good quality public realm?
2 Are appropriate facilities management systems in place? Does the design and layout support these?
3 Are users, businesses and residents involved in management?

Writing general policies

Points to consider when writing a general policy on planning out crime:

1 Does the policy reflect not duplicate national guidance?
2 Is the policy applicable to all development proposals, or should the policy specify possible solutions to particular problems and consider different land uses?
3 Should the policy highlight conflicting priorities that planning for crime prevention might encounter, and encourage alternative responses?
4 Does the policy contribute to wider objectives of good urban design?
5 Does the policy specify whether certain crime prevention measures should only be considered on certain types/sizes of development?

Writing specific policies

Points to consider when writing specific policies on planning out crime:

1 Is the policy needed?
2 Does the policy genuinely respond to a specific issue and context rather than just restating general policy?
3 Does the policy complement general planning policy and national guidance?
4 Would implementation of the policy be helped by supporting supplementary guidance?

Annex 5
Glossary

Accessibility – The ability of people to move round an area and to reach places and facilities, including elderly and disabled people, those with young children and those encumbered with luggage or shopping.

Accessibility planning – Local authorities in England that produce Local Transport Plans (LTPs) will be expected to incorporate accessibility planning within their second LTPs, which will cover the period 2006/07—2010/11. Accessibility planning aims to ensure that there is clearer and more systematic process for identifying and tackling the problems that people face in reaching key services. It will be based on cross-agency partnerships between local transport planners, land use planners, the key service providers and relevant local agencies e.g. CDRPs. (See www.accessibilityplanning.gov.uk for further information)

Active frontage – The frontage or edge of a building or space that has windows and doors as opposed to blank walls, fences and garages.

ALO – Architectural Liaison Officer. A specialist crime prevention officer, employed by Police Forces, who deals with crime risk and designing out crime advice for the built environment.

Brief/development brief/planning brief – This guide refers to site-specific briefs as development briefs. Site-specific briefs are also called a variety of other names, including design briefs, planning briefs and development frameworks.

Brownfield – Land that has previously been developed.

Capable guardian – Crime preventers who are ready, willing and capable of surveillance and intervention. These may include residents, employees, passers-by, police or security guards.

CDRP – Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. Set up through the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, CDRPs must audit crime and disorder in their local authority areas and set up a strategy to reduce it every three years.

Communal space – An area of land, such as gardens, that is typically privately controlled for the shared use of a limited number of people, such as the residents of a residential block.

Community safety – an aspect of the quality of life, a state of existence in which people, individually and collectively, are sufficiently free from or reassured about a range of real and perceived risks centring on crime and related misbehaviour; are sufficiently able to cope with the consequences of those incidents that they nevertheless experience; and if unable to cope alone, are helped to do so, for example by victim support or insurance. All this establishes the conditions for them to pursue the necessities of their cultural, social and economic life; to receive adequate services; to exercise their skills; to enjoy well-being; and to create wealth in the widest sense. Particularly where social cohesion, collective efficacy and a wider obligation to reciprocate develop, the conditions contribute to the community's own capacity specifically to deal with crime and disorder in collaboration with official institutions without making informal social control oppressive, invasive or exclusionary or taking the law into their own hands; and to the development of sustainable communities more generally.

Context – The setting of a site or area, including factors such as traffic, activities and land use as well as landscape and built form.

CPDA – Crime Prevention Design Advisor. A different name for Architectural Liaison Officers, used by some Police Forces including the Metropolitan Police.

CPTED – The main thrust of this approach is that 'the physical environment can be manipulated to produce behavioural effects that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime, thereby improving the quality of life. These behavioural effects can be accomplished by reducing the propensity of the physical environment to support criminal behaviour.' The three overlapping strategies of the CPTED approach are:

– Territorial reinforcement, which argues that physical design can encourage users of a property develop a sense of proprietorship over it. Territoriality is divided into two steps: Pre-occupancy, which is implemented at the design stage and is supported by delineating defensible space (physical limits designed within the layout) and design durability (built in ease of maintenance and durability)

– Natural access controls which incorporate design characteristics to control the movement of people and their vehicles in and out of the premises

– Natural surveillance facilitated by design characteristics that enhance visibility and allow easier observation by the routine users of the property.

Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity – One approach to crime reduction in general which attempts to provide a single, rigorous framework and language for diagnosing the causes of crime and mapping out the kinds of intervention that can address those causes has recently been developed. This approach seeks to help practitioners to identify and think in a systematic, problem solving way by focusing on the immediate causes of crime. It has been a further influence on the formulation of the attributes of safe, sustainable places. Full details can be found at www.crimereduction.gov.uk/learningzone/cco.htm.

Crime pattern analysis – Carried out by the Police and is available through liaison with the Architectural Liaison Officer/Crime Prevention Design Adviser. It comprises four components: crime series identification, trend identification, 'hot-spots' analysis and general profile analysis. This last aspect includes an examination of demographic and social change and its impact on criminality and law enforcement.

Crime prevention – Intervention in the causes of criminal events, to reduce the risk of their occurrence and their potential seriousness. This covers all theories of crime and all approaches to prevention, irrespective of whether these are situational (making crimes harder or less attractive to commit by changing the environment) or offender-oriented ('social'); whether interventions act on remote causes of crime (such as children's early upbringing) or immediate ones (such as the presence of rowdy young people or the vulnerability of a building); and whether they act through enforcement and the criminal justice system, through the wider work of enforcement agencies (such as provision of security advice by architectural liaison officers/design advisers) or (as with Planning) through civil society

Crime reduction – Any action to reduce the frequency and seriousness of criminal events.

Defensible space – Public and semi-public space that is 'defensible' in the sense that it is surveyed, demarcated or maintained by somebody. Derived from Oscar Newman's 1973 study of the same name, and an important concept in securing public safety in urban areas, defensible space is also dependent upon the existence of escape routes and the level of anonymity which can be anticipated by the users of the space.

Defensible space theory argues that a range of mechanisms – real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance – combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents. This control, the theory argues, brings security. Defensible space theory is critical of large buildings that make it impossible to recognise strangers, multitudes of unsupervised access points that made it easier for offenders to access housing projects and escape, the location of housing projects in high crime areas, and their stigmatising appearance. Newman's work explored the notion of 'anonymity', where an individual no longer has sense of belonging to a community. It also highlighted how a lack of surveillance makes it easier to commit crime unseen and how the availability of escape routes makes it easier for the criminal to escape from the scene of the crime.

Honey pot – Places, such as fast food restaurants, where people congregate and linger.

Hot spot – Places where criminal and anti-social behaviour is concentrated.

Inactive frontage – The edge of a building or space which offers no opportunity for surveillance from the building or space.

In-curtilage parking – Where vehicles are parked within the boundary of a property.

Layout – The way buildings, routes and open spaces are placed in relation to one another.

Legibility – The degree to which a place can be easily understood and traversed.

Mixed use development – A mix of uses within a building, on a site or within a particular area. 'Horizontal' mixed uses are side by side, usually in different buildings. 'Vertical' mixed uses are on different floor of the same building.

Movement – People and vehicles going to and passing through buildings, places and spaces. The movement network can be shown on plans, by space syntax analysis, by highway designations, by figure and ground diagrams, through data on origins and destinations or pedestrian flows, by desire lines, by details of public transport services, by walk bands or by detail of cycle routes.

Natural surveillance (or supervision) – The discouragement to wrong-doing by the presence of passers-by or the ability of people to be seen out of surrounding windows. Also known as passive surveillance (or supervision).

Permeability – The degree to which an area has a variety of pleasant, convenient and safe routes through it.

PPG – Planning Policy Guidance Note. A document embodying Government guidance on general and specific aspects of planning policy to taken into account in formulating development plan policies and in making planning decisions.

PPS – Planning Policy Statement. A document setting out Government policy on a specific theme to be taken into account when formulating development plan policies and in making planning decisions. PPSs are replacing PPGs.

Primary route – A street upon which more movement, variety and activity takes place than on smaller surrounding ones.

Private space – The parts of a village, town or city to which public access is restricted.

Public/private interface – The point at which public areas and buildings meet private ones.

Public space/realm/domain – The parts of a village, town or city (whether publicly or privately owned) that are available, without charge, for everyone to use or see, including streets, squares and parks.

Routine activity theory – A theory that seeks to explain why crimes occur, based around three things happening at the same time and in the same place:

– a suitable target is available

– there is the lack of a suitable guardian to prevent the crime from happening

– a likely and motivated offender is present.

Routine activity theory is incorporated with Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity.

Section 17 – Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, states that: 'Without prejudice to any other obligation imposed on it, it shall be the duty of each authority to which this section applies to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area'.

Secured by Design – An award scheme managed by the Association of Chief Police Officers and promoted locally by force Architectural Liaison Officers. Secured by Design advocates:

– Routes (footpaths and roads) that are busy, lit and overlooked; few clear and direct routes through any one location

– Controlled access to individual and common curtilages, and a 'buffer zone' between public and private spaces

– No out of scale facilities (i.e. that aren't intended for the local community), no 'honeypots' (i.e. places that encourage people to congregate)' no 'fear generators' (i.e. places that can become abandoned and encourage anti-social acts and behaviour) and no excessive public space in housing developments

– Secure properties and parking, with minimum standards for target hardening

– Programmed management system (regular grass cutting, ground maintenance, litter and graffiti removal).

Semi-private space – Space that may be privately owned or managed but into which the members of the public may enter if they have a legitimate reason, such as a front garden.

Semi-public space – Space that is publicly accessible but has management practices to inhibit some activities and encourage others, such as shopping centres.

Situational crime prevention – a crime reduction theory which draws from people-based and rational choice approaches, such as 'routine activity theory'. Situational prevention comprises opportunity-reducing measures that:

– Are directed at highly specific forms of crime

– Involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent a way as possible

– Make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders.

– By focusing attention on the opportunity for crime and considering both the management and design of the environment, situational approaches go beyond defensible space and CPTED theories of crime prevention.

Streetscape – The street patterns, furnishings and landscaping that form the built environment.

Surveillance – The discouragement to wrong-doing by the presence of passers-by or the ability of people to be seen from surrounding windows.

Target hardening – Making targets more resistant to attack or more difficult to remove or damage, by, for example:

– fitting better doors, windows or shutters

– window or door locks

– alarms

– screens in banks and building societies

– fencing systems

– repairing damaged and derelict property.

Urban design – The art of making places. Urban design involves the design of buildings, groups of buildings, spaces and landscapes, in villages, towns and cities, and the establishment of framework and processes which facilitate successful development.

Urban renaissance – Making towns and cities more attractive for people to live, work, play and invest in.

Visual permeability – The ability to see from one space to another.

Annex 6
Acknowledgements

This good practice guide sets out how
the planning system is able to deliver
well-designed and safe places. It challenges
all those involved in the design and layout
of new development to think about the most
appropriate crime reduction measures
without compromising the quality of the local
environment. In doing so, it emphasises the
importance of designing to suit the local
context. This guide builds on and complements
Government urban design and crime reduction
objectives and guidance, including
Secured By Design.

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Planning
Officers
Society